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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5685
This study examines recent effective rates of protection 
across the Egyptian economy, using an ad valorem 
price wedge introduced by nontariff barriers and 
energy subsidies, and compares today’s effective rates of 
protection with those of a decade ago. The study uses 23 
aggregated sectors from input-output matrix information. 
Although trade liberalization since the late-1990s has 
had a considerable impact in reducing protection of 
some industries, some sectors, such as the food and 
tobacco sector, remain relatively highly protected, due 
to tariff escalation and nontariff barriers, and due to 
energy subsidies. Energy subsidies are not formally sector 
specific but do favor sectors that are energy intensive (of 
particular note is the electricity sector). 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Middle East and North Africa Region. 
It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development 
policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The authors may be contacted at avaldese@uc.cl and wfoster@uc.cl.
   It appears that energy pricing is part of a strategy to 
subsidize and promote certain industries and in effect 
offset the dis-protection or taxation that results from 
tariffs on intermediate inputs. The case of the cement 
sector is notable because energy subsidies appear to 
almost exactly offset the negative impacts of tariffs and 
indirect taxes. The fertilizer sector has zero nominal 
tariffs, benefiting agriculture, and so a negative effective 
rate of protection due simply to tariffs on intermediate 
inputs. However, the fertilizer sector ends up with a very 
high a positive total effective rate of protection due to 
energy subsidies.  
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A profile of border protection in Egypt: 
An Effective Rate of Protection approach adjusting for energy subsidies 
 




Since the mid-1980s the Egyptian government has moved from an emphasis on state 
planning and high level of protection towards a reliance on private economic activity 
and trade openness. Especially since the late 1990s, Egypt has been committed to 
macroeconomic stability and private sector development; it has privatized several state-
owned firms, and made legal reforms to spur private investment. In addition, the 
government has also pursued a policy of trade liberalization, the elimination of 
quantitative restrictions on imports, and the reduction in tariffs overall. Egypt made 
significant unilateral reforms to reduce border protection in 2004 and 2007, and has 
participated in regional and global negotiations in the WTO.  
 
These reforms, especially the greater openness to trade, would imply significant 
reduction in the levels of protection of Egyptian industries, and perhaps a lower 
dispersion of protections across industries, treating economic sectors more uniformly. 
One simple method of measuring protection to industries is to observe applied tariffs. 
But tariffs by themselves do not reveal all of the practical incentives arising from the 
trade regime that face real-world investors. One should look at the effects of trade 
policy on the net income – value added – generated by industries. A more accurate 
measure for practical policy analysis should account for both protections on the output 
side as well as tariff effects on the costs of tradable inputs. This is the effective rate of 
protection approach used in the present study to capture the incentives for resource 
flows between various sectors. The same nominal tariffs on final products can imply 
large differences in effective protection of industries, because industries differ with 
respect to their use of import-competing inputs and their cost structures are impacted 
differently depending on how such inputs are taxed at the border. In addition there could 
be non-tariff barriers (NTBs) related to policies that effectively raise the price wedge 
between a domestically sold good and its price at the border. 
 
When assessing levels of industry protection in Egypt, one faces the additional major 
complications that the government has maintained subsidies on the provision of some 
goods and high levels of subsidies on energy sources that impact across many 
industries. So one should not only account for the effect of the trade regime at the 
border but also internal advantages to certain industries that result from these two 
sources of subsidies. This study takes care to separate two effects: that of the tariff 
schedule and output subsidies and that of energy subsidies. As a practical matter, we 
make use of information from the 2006/2007 input-output matrix that indentifies five 
fuel-energy sectors (natural gas, industrial and diesel fuels, LPG and gasoline) and 
estimates of price subsidies associated with these energy sources. 
 
After several years of economic reforms and trade liberalization, this is a good moment 
to assess the level of protection of various Egyptian industries, and to discuss the 
implications of the current profile of protection and subsidies for the at-least implicit 
(and perhaps unintended) discrimination between sectors, privileging some and   2 
implicitly taxing others. Differential treatment of sectors via tariffs and subsidies is a 
form of industrial policy, and a benefit of a study of protection rates and subsidies is 
that it helps make explicit at least the contours of such a policy. This type of evidence 
aids in examining whether or not the set of policies now in place conforms to the 
current objectives of the government. The study examines effective rates of protection, 
capturing the effects of tariffs following trade reforms and identifying those activities 
(industries) that are still subject to (or still enjoy) significant degrees of border 
protection and direct subsidies (and where possible NTBs). There is the possibility that 
some activities have negative value added, when valued at border prices and in the 
absence of subsidies, which could merit special attention for policy makers.  
 
This study has three objectives. First, it examines recent effective rates of protection 
across the Egyptian economy. These ERPs are calculated first using formal, applied 
tariffs, and, where possible, using estimates of the ad valorem price wedge introduced 
by NTBs. Second, it incorporates energy subsidies into ERP estimates at the aggregated 
sectoral level. Third, it compares today’s ERPs due to applied tariffs for several 
disaggregated industries with those of a decade ago when trade reforms began. 
 
This report is structured in the following way: The next section discusses in general 
terms the effective rate of protection (ERPs) as a policy indicator, the previous 
information that we have regarding ERPs in Egypt, and data sources for estimating 
current ERPs, including the component related to NTBs. The third section reviews the 
formula by which we implement numerically the effective protection approach, first 
incorporating the adjustments due to tariffs (and the tariff equivalent of NTBs) and net 
output subsidies. Section 3.b. demonstrates how we incorporate subsidies to energy 
inputs and estimate their relative impact on total ERPs. Section 4 discusses specific data 
issues and the level of disaggregation possible.  
 
Section 5 discusses briefly the methods used to estimate the ad valorem tariff equivalent 
of NTBs. The estimates for selected industries were estimated by Dr. Khaled Hanafy, 
and his approach is detailed in Annex 3. Section 6 presents the results of the ERP 
calculations using 2009 Egyptian applied tariffs at a fairly disaggregated industrial level 
making use of cost structure information for selected industries available from a 
previous study done a decade ago. We then compare our results to those of the previous 
study that used 1998/1999 applied tariff levels. We also present for some industries the 
ERPs for 2009 including NTB price-wedge estimates where available.  
 
But these disaggregated cost data do not adjust for energy subsidies and so Section 7 
presents the applied nominal tariffs and the levels and dispersion of ERPs for 23 
industrial sectors where energy input cost shares for the five fuel sources mentioned 
above are available from a recent input-output matrix of the Egyptian economy. These 
ERPs adjust for tariffs, output subsidies and energy subsidies. In addition, the ERPs are 
also estimated adding the estimated tariff equivalent for NTBs. In presenting the results, 
non-tradables and food and agriculture are underlined, and one is led to conjecture to 
what degree energy subsidies could be considered partial compensation for the implicit 
taxes on the sectors from tariffs on tradable inputs. In addition to discussing these 
results, we identify some differences with those of Lederman (2007), who also used an 
approach based on input-output coefficients but with less information on the 
participation of energy inputs in sectors’ cost structures. Section 8 concludes with a 
discussion of the policy implications of the results.      3 
 
2. Effective Rates of Protection in Egypt: Cost-share Data Sources and Previous 
Studies 
 
Effective rates of protection are measures of the impact on an industry’s or economic 
sector’s net returns due to border protection. Nominal tariffs are relevant for consumer 
welfare and the analysis of patterns of consumption. ERPs are relevant for analyzing the 
impact of commercial policies on incentives for resource allocations. Without making 
normative assessment of the desirability of interventions in the form of tariffs and 
subsidies, ERP estimates aid in understanding the effects of these policies on the 
incentive framework for production, and so provide a quantitative measure of economic 
signals guiding investments and factor use. In calculating effective rates of protection 
(ERPs) of industries for any country, there are two technical decisions to make. First, 
what is the most appropriate level of disaggregation to use? Second, based on the 
disaggregation level, how does one incorporate non-tariff barriers? Given the 
information available at the present date for Egypt, the following calculations of ERPs 
focus mainly on the effects of tariffs and energy subsidies, but ERPs are also presented 
that adjust for the estimated effects of NTBs for activities where estimates are available.  
 
The question regarding the level of aggregation is addressed using two sources of cost-
share information at different levels of aggregation. The most detailed cost share data 
available were obtained for a study by Cassing, et al., which was done for a larger 
Nathan Associates project on tariff reforms in Egypt for US AID, completed in October 
2000. (Hereinafter we will refer to this as the Nathan study.) Although ERPs were 
reported in this study, the cost share data on which the ERPs were based are reported in 
greater detail by Nabila Al Iskandarani.
1 These cost-share data cover 20 specific 
industries in the private sector and 17 industries in the public sector. A list of these 
industries and their intermediate inputs are found in Annex Table 1. These industries are 
identified by their 4-digit ISIC code (rev. 3.1).
2 These disaggregated industries served as 
the basis for estimating ad valorem equivalents of non-tariff barriers, presented in 
Annex 3. Note that although most of the public industries in the list continue today, they 
might be much reduced in importance after a decade of economic reforms. Some 
industries that were in the earlier 1999 list are not found in the latest CAPMAS list of 
public industries for 2007/2008: household appliances, carpets and rugs, containers and 
boxes, cutlery and hand tools, agricultural machinery, and pottery.  
 
The other source of cost-share data is the inter-industry intermediate input costs from 
the latest available Egyptian input-output matrix (2006/2007), supplied by the World 
Bank office in Cairo. (See Annex Table 2 for a list of industries. The matrix is available 
upon request.) This particular input-output matrix has 23 industrial sectors, with more 
disaggregation of energy sectors. In his 2007 report, D. Lederman also uses an input-
output matrix from 2005 with 21 sectors, but with more detail in some industries, such 
as agriculture and food, and less in others. (The accompanying Annex Table 2 also 
includes a list of sectors available to Lederman.)  
 
                                                 
1 Her Masters thesis was completed at the American University in Cairo in spring 2001 
2 Given the current ISIC version, in some cases the industries reported in Nathan and Al Isakandarani are 
further disaggregated into more specific industries in the information available from CAPMAS.  See the 
web site http://www.msrintranet.capmas.gov.eg/pls/fdl/bkr2_e?lang=0&lname=   ECS .   4 
Regardless of the level of aggregation or source of cost-shares, a practical problem is 
the appropriate correspondence between products and inputs on one side and tariff lines 
and levels on the other. For this study the basic source of applied tariff data is that 
which the Egyptian government reports to the WTO. The latest such data for 2009 are 
available in the Integrated Data Base at the six-digit level. Tariff information adjusted 
for preferential trade agreements is also available from Bouet et al., although their data 
have not been updated since 2004; and it appears that trade-weighted average tariffs that 
account for preferences differ very little. In fact those lines where preferences and 
applied tariffs differ by more than 10 percent are small, fewer than 7 percent of tariff 
lines for products of any appreciable total import value. Therefore, the decision was 
made to use the updated tariff schedule for 2009, without preference adjustments, 
considering that such an adjustment in the case of Egypt would be highly unlikely to 
alter the results.
3 The reader should note that specific duties appear only to apply to 
tobacco products: there are 11 tariff lines with non-AV duties according to the WTO 
integrated data base. (For the Bouet et al. data base for 2004, these non-AV duties are 
converted to an ad valorem equivalent.) Also note that between the WTO for the years 
2005 and 2006 use the 2002 HS codes, and 2007 and beyond use the 2007 HS codes. At 
least in the case of Egypt, the differences between the code years appears only apply to 
the telephony group (cell phones).  
 
Returning to the topic of aggregation, within each of the 23 sectors in the I-O matrix 
available to this present study, there are, of course, likely to be some subsectors more 
protected than others; and so one would ideally like to see even more detail. The risk of 
a high level of aggregation is that it would hide large disparities between industries 
grouped under the same broad heading. For example, in the tariff data for the food 
industry (the HS 2-digit codes 16 to 24) the simple average is over 200 percent, and 
Lederman reports ERPs for beverages based on average tariffs of 1600 percent.  The 
reason for such large average tariffs at this level of aggregation is seen in Table 1, 
where imported alcoholic beverages are taxed at an almost prohibitively high rate. The 
highest tariff for non-alcoholic and non-automobile products is 30 percent, and is 
usually reserved for finished products produced in Egypt. But within industry groupings 
tariffs range from lows of zero and 2 percent to 10, 20 and 30 percent based on the 
degree of valued added that might be done in Egypt; several sectors show clear cases of 
tariff escalation. When reading the ERP estimates reported below, the reader should be 
aware of this aggregation problem and interpret the result appropriately.  
 
3. A Quick Review of the Algebra of Effective Protection 
 
Because subsidies are important in the case of Egypt, both on outputs and especially on 
energy inputs, the algebra for estimating effective rates of protection requires an 
extension to that usually found in textbooks. We quickly review below the manner by 
which we calculate effective rates of protection, first incorporating output subsidies, 
then input (energy) subsidies. The ERP is defined in terms of the percent deviation of an 
industry’s value added from what it would otherwise be in the absence of protection 
(both formal applied tariffs and NTBs). (See, for example, Corden, 1971, Vousden, 
                                                 
3 Two cases where preferences might make a difference among most-traded goods are HS 270900 
(Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude)  and  HS 090240 (Black fermented tea 
and partly fermented tea, whether or not flavoured, in immediate packings of > 3 kg).   5 
1990
4). This definition accounts for both protection on the product side that might 
increase gross revenues, as well protection on the input side that might increase costs. 
The following algebraic presentation is meant to arrive at a final, practical equation for 
the calculation of ERPs from observed cost-share data and applied tariffs (and where 
available ad valorem equivalents of NTBs). 
a. Deriving the basic ERP formula 
 
The observed value added in some industry g, g VA , is defined as gross revenues less 
the costs of tradable inputs; and this net is therefore the fund available for payments to 
non-tradable inputs (labor and capital) used in the industry. Gross revenues in industry 
g,  g R , are simply the quantity produced of the good,  g y , sold at its domestic price, 
which is the unprotected price,  g p , (referred to as the border price) adjusted by the ad 
valorem equivalent of domestic protection, ) t 1 ( g  , and any net subsidies per unit of 
output,  g (1 s )  ; that is, value added at exchange prices might be less to the degree 
subsidies are positive (a negative subsidy would be a tax). The tariff could be the 
“formal” as stated in the tariff schedules, and should be distinguished from the nominal 
tariff rate (or nominal rate of protection) usually defined as the ad valorem equivalent of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers expressed in relation to the CIF price of imports.
5 (In 
addition, the two tariffs differ if the formal rate is applied to FOB prices, as some 
countries do.) In what follows the tariff adjustment factors (1 ) i t   includes the formal 
applied tariffs on output and inputs and the ad valorem tariff equivalents due to NTBs. 
Annex 3 discusses the estimation of the additional component of the ti’s due to NTBs. 
 
The costs of tradable inputs are similarly obtained by summing over the individual 
costs, gi C , of inputs i used in the industry g ( g I i ); the cost of a specific tradable input, 
i, is its quantity used in the industry, gi x , purchased at its unprotected price,  i p , adjusted 
by an appropriate ad valorem protection  ) t 1 ( i  . That is, 
 
gg
g g g g g i i gi g gi
i I i I
VA p (1 t )(1 s )y p (1 t )x R C

         
which can be rewritten in terms of tradable input costs as shares of gross revenue,  gi a : 
g g g
i i gi gi
g g g g g g g gi
i I i I i I g g g g g
p (1 t )x C
VA p (1 t )(1 s )y 1 R 1 R 1 a
p (1 t )(1 s )y R   
      




The hypothetical value added for the industry – the value added which would otherwise 
prevail without any protections and subsidies whatsoever on the revenue or cost sides – 
can be at least approximated under the assumption that the industry technology is of the 
                                                 
4 The theory of effective protection has been well established since Johnson, H.G. 1965. “The theory 
tariff structures with special reference to world trade and development,” in H.G. Johnson and P.B. Kenen, 
eds., Trade and Development, Geneva, 1965. Balassa, B. 1965. “Tariff protection in industrial countries, 
an evaluation.” Journal of Political Economy, v. 73 (December): 573-94.  
5 Note that tobacco in Egypt has a specific duty applied per weight, rather than a tariff applied against unit 
value.   6 
fixed-coefficient type (that is, the average input use is unresponsive to marginal relative 
price changes). In that case, the cost share of gross revenues that would otherwise 
prevail without protection for an individual input, 
H
gi a , can be written in terms of the 
observed cost share,  gi a , and the ad valorem protection rates: 
i gi i g g HH i
gi gi gi gi
g g g g g g i
p x (1 t ) (1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )
a a a a
p y (1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )(1 s ) 1 t
    
          
 
 
And so, from observed costs as shares of gross revenues,  gi a , and ad valorem protection 
rates – usually observed tariff levels – one can estimate the hypothetical cost shares that 
would prevail without protection. Using the notation defined above, the hypothetical 
value added for industry g without protection and subsidies can be written (with the 
superscript indicating the hypothetical): 
 
g g g
gg H H H H ii
g g g g gi g gi
i I i I i I g g i
(1 t )(1 s ) px
VA p y 1 R 1 a R 1 a
p y 1 t   
       
                          
    
 
The ERP is then estimated as the percent difference of the observed value added from 




g g g gi i g
g HH
g gi
t (1 t )s a t VA
ERP 1








Note, that without subsidies on the output side, the ERP calculation distills into a 





g g gi i
g HH
g gi
VA t a t
ERP 1








It is this last equation that is applied in Section 5 to the disaggregated industries used in 
the Nathan study. But in the case of Egypt there is another important source of 
intervention, energy subsidies, which interact with the tariff regime to impact the 
profitability of economic sectors. 
b. Adding input subsidies – reduced energy costs – to the ERP calculation 
 
In the case of Egypt energy subsidies are significant and can influence the effective 
rates of protection of particular industries, depending on their use of various energy 
sources. See for example, the 2009 World Bank report “Transforming Egypt: A 
Development Policy Review”; Lederman, 2005; and notably the April 2009 study by 
                                                 
6 At this point, one should note that this present study estimates the hypothetical costs as shares of gross 
revenue from observed cost shares and observed tariffs, a methodological strategy that relies on the 
assumption that input substitution elasticities are small. (See Sampson, 1974, for a critique of this 
assumption.) Alternatively one could estimate the hypothetical cost shares from other sources; one 
strategy in the literature has been to use benchmark cost shares from other countries with similar 
technologies but much less protection (e.g., Sampson and Yeats, 1979).   7 
Abouleinein, El-Laithy and Kheir-El-Din, which makes use of the same input-output 
information made available for this present study. The importance of subsidies can be 
appreciated by comparing for various energy sectors the value added at factor cost and 
value added at market prices (exchange prices paid by buyers). As seen in Table 2, 
subsidies account for a large percent of value added at factor prices, especially in the 
case of LPG. These subsidies are in exchange for lower energy prices to other 
industries, which to some degree translate into lower prices generally for consumers. 
Abouleinein, El-Laithy and Kheir-El-Din examine in some detail simulated impacts on 
the consumer price index of various scenarios for reducing energy subsidies; the effects 
on consumer prices of removing subsidies appear to be considerable. In this present 
study, we examine the impact of removing the subsidy at the industry level through the 
subsidies contribution to the ERPs. 
 
Lederman (2005) presents rough estimates of the impacts of energy subsidies on ERPs 
for selected industries taken from the 2005 input-output information and the 2007 
Egyptian tariff schedule. Although recognizing that energy subsidies enter the value-
added equation via costs, the basic formula used by Lederman for the ERP of an 













where the aI is the share of intermediate factors (ideally in terms of prices without 
intervention) and Sg are net subsidies: indirect taxes and other subsidies plus energy 
subsidies estimated in terms of an ad valorem equivalent addition to output price.  In his 
appendix, Lederman does discuss the ERP accounting for an adjustment in the price of 
tradable inputs by both tariffs and a subsidy rate on inputs, SI: 
 
g g I I I
g
I
(1 t )(1 S ) a (1 t )(1 S )
ERP 1
(1 a )




which is the approach we take here.
7  
 
For those five inputs with subsidies of interest – namely, natural gas, fuel oil (mazot), 
diesel oil (solar), LPG and gasoline – the cost shares of gross revenues that would 
otherwise prevail without both protection and subsidies for an individual input, 
H
gi a , can 
again be written in terms of the currently observed cost share,  gi a , and the ad valorem 
protection rates: 
 
i gi i i g g HH ii
gi gi gi gi
g g g g g g i i
p x (1 t )(1 S ) (1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )(1 S )
a a a a
p y (1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )(1 S )
     
           
 
 
And so the practical ERP formula above in Section 3.a. above for applied tariffs and the 
ad valorem tariff equivalents due to NTBs should be modified somewhat to account for 
                                                 
7 Lederman (2005) does not appear to apply the energy subsidies per unit of energy use from a particular 
source, SI, likely due to lack of appropriate detail in the input-cost-share data. As discussed further on, 
such source-specific subsidy data is now available from Abouleinein, , El-Laithy and Kheir-El-Din 
(2009).   8 
subsidies for energy inputs. Again the ERP with subsidies is estimated as the percent 
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The innovation of the last equation above is that, with subsidies there are two effects: 
that of the tariff schedule, NTBs and output subsidies (the first term on the right hand 
side of the above equation) and that of the input subsidy (the second term), in the 
present due to energy subsidies.  
 
As a practical matter in this present study, using information from the 2006/2007 input-
output matrix, the ERPs with input subsidies on five energy input are estimated using 
adjusted, observed cost shares (the agi) relative to gross revenue: 
 
 
g g i g
g g g gi i gi
i i i
g
g g g g
gi gi
i i i i
(1 t )(1 s ) S (1 t )
t (1 t )s a t a
(1 t )(1 S ) (1 S )
ERP
(1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )(1 s )
1 a 1 a
(1 t )(1 S ) (1 t )(1 S )
      
              
           





The above is the “programmable” equation for practical calculations. Note that 
reference hypothetical value added is that of no interventions at all: the cost-share 
coefficients are changing due to changes in relative prices arising from both applied 
tariffs (and NTBs) and input subsidies. An additional note of caution is that the ERP 
approach does not account for possible factor substitution that could occur as the results 
of a different trade and subsidy regime. It is an approach based on a fixed-coefficient 
technology, the costs of which are adjusted by changes in tariffs of inputs and outputs. It 
is hard to anticipate what would be an industry’s response to new relative price 
situations in its choice of technology. It would be even more difficult to anticipate the 
final impacts of a simultaneous change in many industries (23 in the input-output matrix 
used below). (Some simulation approaches pretend to adjust for input substitutability 
via assuming predetermined values for elasticities of substitution, often the same values 
across heterogeneous industries.) So we interpret the results of the ERP approach as 
described in the above equations as first-order approximations of the impacts of 
interventions on the net income of individual industries and sectors.      9 
 
4. A Discussion of Energy Subsidies and Tariff Data Sources and Implications for 
the Level of Disaggregation 
 
Energy subsidies rates for calculating ERPs from the I-O matrix: sources. 
 
For this present study the subsidy rates for the various energy sources are derived from 
the “best-guess” estimates of Abouleinein, El-Laithy and Kheir-El-Din (2009) of the 
percentage adjustments that would have to be made to observed prices to reach per-unit 
actual domestic costs (presented in the fourth column of their Table 4, p. 16). These 
percentage increases – and their translation into the ad valorem subsidy rates used in the 
above formula (the Si) – are shown in Table 3. In fact these energy subsidy estimates 




Applied (formal) tariff levels for selected industries, products and intermediate inputs.  
 
The 2009 tariff levels from the WTO used in the present calculations of the ERPs for 
the selected sectors, plus those used by Nathan Associates and Al Iskandarani from the 
late 1990s, are presented in Annex Table 1.  Note that the sectors are ISIC codes (rev. 
3), while the activities are from the US SIC, as used in the Nathan study. And so, the 
final column of the Annex Table 1 includes notes and references to the 
correspondences, which this present study uses, between products (and inputs) and the 
HS 6-digit tariff schedule as found in the WTO Integrated Database for Egypt.  
 
One alternative for selecting tariff levels for industries is to simply average over the 
lines associated with some aggregate activity, such as textiles or agriculture. In fact this 
is what is done in the following section at the HS 2-digit level when assessing 
protection of industrial groups in the 23-sector input-output table for Egypt (see also 
Lederman, 2005).  Instead of averaging many tariff lines across the 2-digit level, 
however, in the case of the specific industries available, we have differentiated activities 
according to the level of processing and delved into tariffs at the 4 and 6-digit level.  
 
This disaggregation is important because the degree of tariff escalation in Egypt 
emerges clearly on observing how the formal tariff levels increase with the level of 
processing. For example in cotton textiles (HS2 56s), the raw cotton enters at a zero 
tariff, but carded cotton and any processing to threads, enters at 5 percent. For woven 
cotton materials, the tariff jumps to 10 percent; and for articles of clothing (HS2 61s), 
that is, final products, the tariff jumps to 30 percent. The dispersion around the 2-digit 
level averages is much higher than those around the average for a particular 4-digit level 
grouping of products. In fact, Egyptian tariffs tend to be uniform at any particular 4-
digit level group, and it is very difficult to encounter more than one-line tariffs at the 6-
digit level.  
 
After considerable examination, we conclude that the 4-digit (and sometimes 6-digit) 
levels are more appropriate to capture more homogeneous groups. The degree to which 
product processing is associated with higher tariffs is well observed at the 4-digit level. 
                                                 
8 There appear to be no statistically constructed IO tables since 1992, and all available tables are updates.   10 
As can be seen in Annex Table 1, for each sector we have attempted to select 
appropriate tariff levels rather than averages over many, disparate tariff lines. That is, 
for a specific industry we have tended to choose a specific tariff, or an average over a 
few appropriate tariffs lines associated with more-processed products. For the tradable 
inputs used by the sector, we have tended to choose tariff lines associated with raw 
products or lower processed products. Note that Annex Table 1 also includes, for each 
industry, the share of total tradable input costs associated with specific inputs. The list 
of inputs is specific to each industry. 
 
5. Estimating Non-tariff Barriers for Selected Activities 
 
By their nature, non-tariff barriers are not established by policy makers in terms of ad 
valorem equivalents. They involve, therefore, some detective work to estimate them. 
The case of purely quantitative restrictions (QRs) is a special case, because with some 
information of relevant supply and demand elasticities, the NTB can be extracted in 
terms of a price wedge. Unfortunately many NTBs, however, are not so explicit as QRs.  
One source of NTBs, for example, might simply be administrative delays that raise the 
local component of the costs of imported goods. Other NTBs can be import licenses to 
be negotiated with trade authorities, testing protocols for food and drugs,and  sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary restrictions, which – while in themselves might not be formal trade 
restrictions – can be used as instruments for protection against import competition. 
Annex 3 presents some NTBs that are noteworthy to market participants in Egypt.   
 
For this present report, Dr. Khaled Hanafy prepared estimates of price wedges between 
domestic prices of imported goods and their border prices, adjusting for applied tariffs, 
transport costs and, where appropriate, marketing margins. Annex 3 discusses the 
details of the NTB tariff-equivalent estimation for selected industries for which we have 
more detailed cost-share estimate from the Nathan study from 1999. It is important to 
point out that although the price wedge approach used here gives an estimate of the 
tariff equivalent of NTBs, it says nothing about the exact policies or policy instruments 
acting as NTBs, nor does it reflect their respective contributions. 
 
The NTB estimates, as seen in Annex Table 3, cover a heterogeneous group of goods, 
but only where a CIF price is available. The reader will note that some products have 
explicit marketing margin estimates, some without. Even in the case of explicit 
marketing margin estimates, the NTB ad valorem estimates might be implicitly 
incorporating domestic marketing costs, including inventory costs, distribution and 
maintenance costs, advertising cost, and so on. If one takes all products in Annex Table 
3, the average of all NTB ad valorem estimates is slightly less than 26 percent. Perhaps 
more representative for inputs used in manufacturing is to take the average NTB ad 
valorem estimates over the products that are of lower value added. That is, to take an 
average excluding jewelry, autos, soaps and cosmetics, table spreads, drinking glasses 
and cups, hand drills and refrigerators, all of which have high estimated price wedges 
due to NTBs. After excluding these high value-added goods, the average NTB ad 
valorem is slightly more than 9 percent.  
 
What the tariff equivalent estimates of the NTBs emphasize is that there are sectors for 
which the ad valorem equivalents of barriers are apparently very high, and that there is a 
large dispersion among all NTB estimates. On the surface, this is puzzling, but certainly   11 
possible. One would have to investigate the institutional arrangements in some of these 
markets to see if these high NTB estimates are reflecting true policy-related barriers to 
imports, or are reflecting missing costs that would raise marketing margins and so 
reduce the true NTB wedge. Another question regards the specific policy instruments 
that are generating these barriers. If these NTB estimates are approximately true, it 
would indicate a rather aggressive industrial policy, favoring certain activities (firms) 
relative to others. We note that there is a correlation between higher NTB ad valorem 
wedges and formal tariffs. From the subset of activities for which we have estimates, 
the price impacts of NTBs tend to increase with the domestic share of value added, 
which suggests that NTB might be protecting activities involving high levels of 
employment. This hypothesis could not be test in this study. 
 
For the estimation of ERPs with NTB effects in the case of specific industries (Section 
6), we use the ad valorem estimates of Dr. Hanafy for the outputs, and for tradable 
inputs we use the average of 9 percent NTB equivalent associated with low-value added 
products. (Cement is the only exception, where there appears to be little applied tariff or 
NTB restrictions on product or raw materials.) For ERP estimates for the aggregate 
sectors from the input-output matrix (Section 7), there are only six sectors to which we 
add to the applied tariffs the estimates of the ad valorem effects of NTBs (see Table 5b). 
The sectors to which were applied NTB estimates were those that corresponded most 
closely to the specific industries and products for which tariff-equivalent estimates were 
available at the disaggregated industry level from Dr. Hanafy. There are three sectors to 
which we applied the average tariff-equivalent of 9 percent (i.e., excluding the high-
value-added goods mentioned above); and there are three sectors that closely matched 
the industries for which we apply the NTB estimates directly (textiles, fertilizers, and 
iron and steel).
9  For the five non-tradable sectors NTB, tariff equivalents are not 
applicable. For other tradable sectors to which are applied zero NTB equivalents, no 
information is available and no significant NTB effects were assumed. Nevertheless, the 
ERPs of those sectors will also be indirectly affected by NTB through changes in the 
cost shares of inputs directly impacted by NTBs. 
 
6. Results: Levels and Dispersion of ERPs across Selected Industries, Tariffs Only 
(without Energy Subsidies), Comparing 2009 with the Late 1990s 
 
Table 4a presents the ERP results for private and public industries, comparing ERPs 
using 2009 applied tariff data and the tariffs used in the Nathan study of the late 1990s 
(which did not include NTB adjustments). ERPs for 2009 that include estimated NTB 
effects are discussed below.  
 
We first concentrate our discussion of the private sector results in Table 4a. On average, 
ERPs in the private sector declined from 86 percent to 45 percent (excluding sector 
2102 – boxes and container, which as discussed below is a special case). And as can be 
seen in Annex Table 1, applied tariffs – that is, nominal rates of protection – also 
declined generally across the board. In addition, the dispersion of ERPs, as measured by 
the standard deviation, fell from 1999 to 2009 (from 192 to 57 percent, excluding sector 
2102).  
                                                 
9 The sector “textiles” matches with ISIC #1711 (spinning, weaving and finishing), the sector “fertilizers” 
matches with ISIC #2412 (manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides), and the sector iron and steel matches 
with ISIC #2710 (manufacture of iron and steel basic industries).   12 
 
Note, however, that certain industries had large increases in their ERPs relative to the 
late 1990s. Although the level of tariff protection on the final product declined, the 
levels of protection on the inputs fell even more, so that the effective protection on the 
industry increased. The example of textiles (except garments, which are not reported 
separately) is notable (see Annex Table 1). With the 1998 tariff levels, this product was 
protected at an average tariff of 36%, and the tariff fell to 30% in 2009. But some of the 
inputs in 1998 were protected at a high rate as well (e.g., nonwoven fabrics at 28% and 
fabricated textiles n.e.c. at 39%), these tariffs falling to 5% by 2009. So the ERP on this 
textile industry rises from 84% to 229%! So while the consumer benefits from the price 
decline in the final product on the order of about 6 percentage points, the returns to 
domestic value added in the industry increases by 145 percentage points!  
 
For many industries there were declines in ERPs, some significant, over the past 
decade, due to the decline in output tariffs relative to input tariffs. Consider the case of 
motor vehicles: there were significant declines in the tariffs of the inputs, falling from a 
range of 20 to 30 percent to a range of 5 to 10 percent (with the exception of tires, with 
a 20 percent tariff). But the product tariff - which is the one that matters for the 
consumer - also decreased significantly from 35 to 10 percent. The reader should note 
that this ERP is relevant only for relatively inexpensive cars, because expensive cars are 
not manufactured in Egypt. Consumers of expensive automobiles still face nominal 
tariffs of 40 percent, up to 135 percent.  
 
In two private sector industries in Table 4a, fertilizers and cement, the ERPs with 2009 
tariffs decline and turn slightly negative. That is the decrease in output tariffs for these 
important inputs for other industries (agriculture and construction) fell considerable. 
Fertilizers (HS 31s) enter the country with a zero tariff, but use tradable inputs with 
positive tariffs. Similarly, cement (HS 25s), the most representative material for 
construction being Portland cement, can be imported at a 2 percent tariff, but again 
makes use of other tradable inputs with higher tariffs. Not adjusting for energy 
subsidies, the tariff profile alone stimulates the consumption of these products by 
making domestic prices practically at import parity, but discourages to some degree the 
production of the product by raising the cost of tradable inputs. The result is a slight dis-
protection or taxing of these industries reflected in negative ERPs. We shall see in the 
next section discussing Table 5a, where we examine the sectors “fertilizer” and 
“cement” as classified in the input-output matrix, that these two sectors without any 
interventions – importantly energy subsidies – would have negative value addeds; their 
economic survival appears to be dependent on energy subsidies.  
 
One should also note in Table 4a the special case of industry 2102, manufacture of 
containers, paper boxes, etc., which has very large ERPs due to the large share of 
tradable inputs, which makes the denominator of the ERP formula very small. Small 
changes in tariffs can cause large proportional changes in value added and large swings 
in the ERP. Interestingly, using the 1998 tariffs, the unprotected value added of the 
industry would have been negative, and so industry only existed due to the tariff profile 
at the time. With the 2009 tariff profile, the industry still has a cost of tradable inputs 
relative to output value that represents 92 percent at border prices; that is, at border 
prices there would be apparently very little value added. At current prices, after 
interventions, CAPMAS reports for 2007 that “paper pulps, paperboard carton industry” 
has a value added of about 22 percent of gross value of output. The industry appears to   13 
be an assembly of tradable inputs. In fact, raw material represents about 60 percent of 
the products value.  
 
A note on the public sector 
 
According to CAPMAS data for 2007/2008 the public sector represents 35 percent of 
the gross value of output, which might appear large except that petroleum products and 
derivatives represent 75 percent of the total public sector output. Thus the share of the 
public sector in the non-oil-related sector is now about 9 percent. Moreover, the net 
value added of the private sector – even including petroleum – is five times that of the 
public. The government maintains a role in industries outside of extraction and 
refinement of oil, which might be considered “strategic”: spinning and fiber textiles, 
sugar and refining, tobacco, coke, steel, and non-ferrous metals. These six sectors, plus 
petroleum extraction and refining, make up 91 percent of the gross output of the public 
sector. 
 
The ERPs in the public sector have fallen between 1999 and 2009, except for the case of 
glass and glass products.
10 The average for those industries still public fell to 37 percent 
from 122 percent across public industries in 1999. And the dispersion of ERPs also fell 
notably: from 145 to 63 percent. The reader will note that in Table 4a one public sector 
activity has a high and negative ERP using the 2009 tariff data (soap, perfume and 
cosmetics).  This is because under some conditions, value added without intervention is 
negative – the cost of importing these goods (at social costs for tradables) would be less 
than the cost of domestic production. That is, using the notation of the formulas above, 
H
g V < 0 . For example if value added with interventions is positive, say 100, and without 
interventions is negative, say –10, then interventions would be benefiting the sector by a 
positive 110, But the ERP would be negative – in this example, minus 11. This is a quite 
different situation from the case of interventions disprotecting or net-taxing a sector, as 
is observed for fertilizers and cement. The ERP in the latter case of taxation would be 
negative, but due to the numerator being negative: the value added without “protection” 
would be greater than the actual, observed value added. For this public sector industry, 
the high negative value is actually signaling very high protection rates.  
 
ERPs by selected industries for 2009, including estimated NTB equivalents 
 
The Nathan and Al Iskandarani studies for the late 1990s did not include NTBs. For the 
present study, as discussed above, the tariff-equivalents of NTBs were estimated for 16 
industries using comparisons of domestic and border prices (as detailed in Annex 3). 
Table 4b presents the ERP estimates that include the NTB ad valorem equivalents for 
both outputs and inputs (as discussed in Section 5) for both public and private 
industries. The inclusion of the tariff-equivalent NTB estimates increases the dispersion 
of ERPs, increasing the standard deviation in the private sector from 71.7 percent 
without NTBs to over 5000 percent with NTBs. This increase in the dispersion of ERPs 
is because the ad valorem addition to protection of industries due to NTBs ranges from 
                                                 
10 Note that by 2009, there were five industries with no public sector involvement that did have 
involvement in 1998: #1722, 2102, 2893, 2921, and 2930.   14 
almost zero in the case of cement to over 120 percent in the case of motor vehicles, with 
rates of over 40 percent for finished textiles, jewelry, and soaps and cosmetics. 
 
The impact of the NTB equivalents for several sectors appears very large, but for others 
the impact is relative small. For example, as can be seen by comparing Tables 4a and 4b 
in the case of private industries in 2009 the inclusion of NTB estimates on ERPs are 
small for ISIC #1711 (spinning and finishing textiles), #2423 (drugs and medicine), 
#2610 (glass products), #2694 (cement), and #2710 (iron and steel).  
 
The inclusion of NTBs estimates affect the ERPs notably (in the private sector) for 
industries #2101 (pulp and paper), #2412 (fertilizers and pesticides), #2893 (cutlery and 
hand tools), #2921 (agricultural machinery), and #3110 (electrical appliances); the 
impact is extremely high in the cases of industries #1721 (textiles except garments), 
#2424 (soap and cosmetics), #2511 (tires and tubes), #3410 (automobiles) and #3811 
(jewelry). For these latter industries, the estimated tariff equivalents of the NTBs are 
high as seen in Annex Table 3, reaching 120 percent in the case of automobiles. 
 
The tire and tube industry (#2511) is an interesting case to compare private and public 
firms. With the addition of the NTB tariff equivalent estimate to the ERP, the value 
added of the private sector industry becomes negative (i.e., the industry would not exist 
without interventions), and so its ERP becomes high and negative. Interestingly, the 
same industry in the public sector maintains a positive ERP, after adjusting for NTBs, 
because it employs relatively more domestic resources (mainly labor) and the resulting 
share of tradable inputs relative to gross output is much smaller. While the value added 
over tradable inputs is reduced in the public industry with the removal of interventions, 
it still remains positive, unlike the industry in the private sector. In fact, using the 
CAPMAS 2006/2007 Annual Bulletin of Industrial Production Statistics, the wage bill 
for the private and public tire and tube industries are practically the same, but the wage 
bill represents only 5 percent in the private sector and 20 percent in the public. (We note 
also that the public industry represent about one-fifth of the gross output of the private 
tire and tube industry.) Intuitively, one would think that there must be a subsidy to the 
public firm in this industry, but no explicit subsidy appears in the CAPMAS statistics 
going to the public enterprise, although the statistics show a subsidy to the private firms 
in this industry. The inference is that returns to capital in the public industry is very low, 
representing an implicit subsidy.  
7. Results: ERPs Incorporating Energy Subsidies for 23 Sectors from 2006/2007 
Input-Output Information 
 
Table 5a shows the ERP calculations for 23 industrial sectors in Egypt, using applied 
tariffs, net output subsidies and subsidies on energy inputs. Table 5b shows the ERP 
calculations including the NTB estimates. Table 6 shows the industrial categories used 
to construct the average tariffs associated with each sector. In some cases, for example 
LPG, specific tariff lines are available. Where specific tariff lines are not used, sector 
tariff are calculated by using averages over tariff lines in the appropriate category. 
Sector-level tariffs are shown in the first column of figures in Tables 5a and 5b. The 
second column of figures in Table 5b shows the ad valorem addition due to NTBs. The 
reader should note that due to the extremely high tariffs on alcoholic beverages (as seen   15 
in Table 1), the sector-level tariff of 25.8 percent on “food and tobacco” excludes that 
specific beverage group from calculating the average.
11  
 
Because of the more speculative nature of estimation of NTB equivalents, we 
concentrate here on the ERPs in Table 5a using applied tariff and information on energy 
subsidies. There are a many interesting results in Table 5a, but we will focus on a few 
that raise relevant policy issues. Note first that the dispersion of nominal protection on 
tradables is not very high, the levels of tariffs ranging between zero on fertilizers to 
25.8% on food, with an average of 8 percent. The sectors with the relatively highest 
tariffs are food and tobacco, textiles, aluminum products, other industries and non-metal 
industries, in that order. Despite the relatively low dispersion of nominal tariffs, the 
effective rates of protection have a very wide range, from high positive to high 
negatives. Excluding the three sectors with negative value added in the absence of 
intervention, the standard deviation of total ERPs is 373 percent in comparison to an 
average of 190 percent. Note that most of the dispersion and most of the average is due 
to tariffs and output subsidies, not the energy subsidies. The average ERP due to energy 
subsidies over these 20 sectors is 53 percent with a standard deviation of 82 percent. 
 
It is interesting to compare these results with those of D. Lederman’s draft report of 
2007. As seen in Annex Table 2, he used a different breakdown of 21 aggregated 
sectors, focusing on downstream, natural resource sectors, (e.g., separating food, from 
tobacco, from beverages, including wood and paper as separate sectors, subdividing 
agriculture into two subsectors, and explicitly including cotton). In addition, given the 
level of cost share detail available, Lederman could not adjust cost share coefficients for 
border prices and no subsidies, importantly energy subsidies. This implies that the 
factor costs as shares of gross output (the denominator in the ERP formula) would differ 
between Lederman’s approach and that of the present study. For example, for non-metal 
industries, Lederman reports factor costs as a share of gross output equal to 72 percent, 
while this present study finds this share in the absence of intervention equal to 42 
percent.  
 
Therefore, when there is an overlap between studies in the aggregated sectors, some of 
the ERPs estimates in this present study differ considerably from those of Lederman. 
For example, for textiles, although he reports similar levels of applied product tariffs, 
Lederman finds an ERP of 95.6 percent (84 percent, without subsidies), while this 
present study finds a total ERP of about 20 percent (and a slightly negative ERP due 
only to tariffs and output subsidies). For non-metal industries, Lederman finds a total 
ERP of 23.6 percent, and this present study finds 3 percent. In the case of agriculture, 
however the Lederman ERPs are similar to those of the present study. Both studies 
report similar applied nominal tariffs, high ERPs for many sectors, high dispersions of 
ERPs across sectors, and both find that energy subsidies in some sectors contribute 
significantly to total ERPs.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, there are tradable sectors which have high and 
negative ERPs because the value added without intervention is negative (
H
g V < 0).  That 
is, without the total package of interventions, these activities would be replaced by 
                                                 
11 In comparing the results in this study to those of Lederman (2005) , an additional source of differences 
in the ERPs is due to the inclusion of alcoholic beverages in the Lederman results, which raises average 
tariffs in his Beverages sector to over 1600 percent.     16 
imports (without significant restructuring). This is the case for “other chemicals,” “fuel 
oil (mazot).”  
 
First, consider “other chemicals.” This sector benefits by modest output tariffs (8.4% ) 
and the tariffs associated with the sector’s main domestic intermediate inputs are also 
modest. Where the sector is taxed on the input side is in the level of duties on imported 
intermediate inputs (over 15%), which suggests that the sector is purchasing from 
abroad more highly processed products, given the escalation of the Egyptian tariff 
schedule. So the net impact on value added of the tariff regime is relatively small. 
Where the sector benefits most highly is from the input subsidy on fuel oil, the cost of 
which represents 16% of gross revenues. Eliminating all intervention – most 
importantly the energy subsidy – would make the sector, given current prices, 
unprofitable. The ERP estimates would be negative due to the negative denominator, 
not due to a negative numerator. That is, the true rate of protection is given by the 
absolute value of the ERPs, which we indicate by placing the estimates associated with 
this sector in parentheses. This is the same with fuel oil, the value added of which 
without intervention is near zero, but slightly negative (–2.8 percent of gross revenues). 
The observed value added is much higher than the hypothetical value added without 
interventions.  
Impact of intervention on non-tradables 
 
In the case of the five non-tradable sectors, given that these sectors use tradable inputs, 
the ERPs are influenced only by output subsidies, and tariffs and subsidies on inputs. 
The estimates of the ERP component due to tariffs and output subsidies are all negative, 
mainly due to tariffs on tradable inputs. But for two sectors (transport and other 
services) total ERPs turn positive due to large energy subsidies. For the restaurants and 
electricity sectors, energy subsidies mitigate but do not completely compensate for the 
negative effects of input tariffs. The construction sector uses little of the subsidized 
energy sources, and so it suffers a negative ERP of -15 percent. This sector does, 
however, make use of a large amount of electricity, the price of which is indirectly 
subsidized via the subsidy on natural gas. 
 
The case of negative value added for electricity without subsidies – a non-tradable – is 
clear: although protective tariffs on the product are nonexistent, the industry relies 
heavily on subsidized natural gas. In the absence of such subsidies, electricity prices 
would have to rise. Transport and communications, another non-tradable, is taxed 
indirectly through imported inputs, as seen in the ERP calculation due only to tariffs and 
output subsidies (the third column of figures), but it is benefited greatly by energy 
subsidies, which produce a positive relatively high total ERP. In fact, energy subsidies 
(mainly on diesel and gasoline) represent 121 percent of the sectors total ERP. The 
sector “hotels and restaurants” is an interesting case, because it is also a non-tradable, 
suffering from tariff protection of inputs, but energy subsidies, while positive, do not 
fully mitigate border policies and indirect taxes. Thus the net ERP for this sector is 
slightly negative (–4.7 percent).    
Energy subsidies as compensation for input tariffs? 
 
Another notable feature of Table 5 is the case of industries with negative partial ERPs 
due to just tariffs and net output, but with positive total ERPs. They are taxed on the   17 
trade policy side, but being compensated with energy subsidies. It appears that energy 
pricing is part of a strategy to subsidize and promote certain industries and in effect 
offset the dis-protection or taxation that results from tariffs on intermediate inputs. From 
Table 5, cases where negative ERPs without considering energy subsidies switch to 
positive ERPs after adjusting for energy subsidies are: textiles, fertilizers, non-metal 
industries, engineering and machinery, and transport and communication.  
 
The case of the cement sector is notable because energy subsidies appear to almost 
exactly offset the negative impacts of tariffs and indirect taxes. The total ERP for 
cement, accounting for tariffs, output subsidies less indirect taxes, and energy subsidies 
results in an ERP practically zero (-1.6 percent). The fertilizer sector has zero nominal 
tariffs, benefiting agriculture, and so a negative ERP due simply to tariffs on 
intermediate inputs, but ends up with a very high a positive total ERP due to energy 
subsidies.  
 
Another case of note is construction, which consumes a large amount of competitively 
price cement and moderately-taxed iron and steel. But it is a non-traded sector and so 
the net effect of the tariff regime is a tax to the sector. Because construction does not 
consume an appreciable amount of the fuel-related energy products that are subsidized, 
its total ERP remains negative. Nevertheless, the sector uses significant amount of 
electricity (about 15 percent of gross revenue or 27 percent of the total intermediate 
input costs).
12 And the electricity sector gains notably by the subsidy on natural gas. 
Simulations in a general equilibrium framework, where removal of energy subsidies 
would result in an increase in electricity prices, would likely show substantial 
reductions in the profit margins of construction. 
 
Food and agriculture 
 
Finally, consider the two sectors agriculture and food. Agriculture as a whole has a 
relatively low nominal protection (8.3 percent), and enjoys small energy subsidies. (For 
individual activities, however, there might be considerable differences.)  Agriculture’s 
ERP is relatively low, in part due to its low share of intermediate inputs in its cost 
structure – i.e., it is not taxed much through intermediate inputs. The partial ERP due to 
just tariffs and indirect taxes (9.7 percent) is close to the nominal rate of protection, 
Moreover, agriculture does not benefit directly to a significant degree from energy 
subsidies. (Again, electricity might be a factor.)  An interesting case relevant to 
agriculture is that of fertilizers. Fertilizers have entered with very low tariffs, and now 
come in at zero percent. As seen above, due to tariffs on their tradable inputs they are 
dis-protected if one does not account for energy subsidies. But adding energy subsidies 
gives a final effective rate of protection of 120 percent. Agriculture is enjoying an 
unprotected price of fertilizers, the local production of which is subsidized by cheap 
energy. Eliminating the energy subsidies might increase the dependence on imported 
fertilizer, but unlikely to change much the price of the input to farmers (unlike 
electricity). 
 
                                                 
12 The reader should perhaps be cautious of the figures for construction in the input-output matrix. 
Electricity costs for the construction sector are approximately equal to the sum of the costs on 
domestically produced cement, and iron and steel. Imported inputs represent 18 percent of intermediate 
input costs, but the matrix shows import duties of zero.   18 
In contrast, the food and tobacco sector has several benefits from the current policy 
regime. It buys raw materials from agriculture (representing over a third of share in 
costs) at fairly competitive domestic prices, and benefits from tariffs on food products 
that are the highest nominal protection level across all sectors (25.8 percent). Thus, the 
sector enjoys a very high and positive (partial) ERP due to tariffs and output subsidies, 
reaching 481 percent. Note that our ERP includes food subsidies – mainly on wheat 
products – on the order of 9500 million LE – which represents 1.3 percent of total 
national value added (almost 2 percent of GDP according to Cassing et al., 2007).  
 
Adding energy subsidies increases the protection (subsidy) to the food sector by even 
more; such subsidies represent more than a third of a total ERP for the food sector of 
well over 700 percent. One reason why the ERP on food is so high is that, after 
removing all interventions, its share of value added as a proportion of gross output in 
this sector would fall to a very low level (4.9 percent). This implies that the sector is 
very tradable and thus sensitive to tariff changes. This high level of protection for the 
food sector can indirectly benefit domestic agriculture in activities competitive with 
imports, because it demands more raw materials from the farm sector. But in the 
absence of the explicit and implicit subsidies to the food sector, this sector would likely 
contract, perhaps substantially, resulting in a higher level of imports. Production 
agriculture might lose domestic demand, but the impact on specific farm activities could 
be diverse and beyond the scope of this analysis.  
 
What is missing in the ERP for agriculture is the cost of water. According to the recent 
study by Cassing et al. (2007. p. 91), “the marginal cost of water to farmers is zero, 
which has encouraged water-intensive crops, such as rice, banana, and sugar cane.”  
(Other studies for Egypt have tried to incorporate the shadow price of water into an 
ERP, but this was very “preliminary” analysis.) 
 
From the same source, we have for Egyptian agricultural products some nominal rates 
of assistance from direct price comparisons. The authors conclude that the direct 
disincentives in farming overall in the mid-2000s were not large. They concluded, 
however, that milk, cotton and rice continued to suffer significantly negative NRAs (-
19.3%, -23.8, and -34.1%., respectively) In contrast, there were some significantly 
positive NRAs: maize (17.8%), wheat (6.0%) and sugar (7.2%).  But to judge the 
practical effects of the trade regime on incentives at the product level one would have to 
examine effective rates of protection, which in turn requires estimates of the cost 
structure of each activities (not available in the Cassing et al. study). 
 
Adding NTB equivalents to the ERP estimates by sector using the 2006/2007 I-O matrix 
 
Tariff equivalents of NTBs by sector were not available for this study, and so to assess 
the impact of NTBs on ERPs at the sectoral level, the industry estimates from Dr. 
Hanafy were applied where appropriate. The six sectors to which we add to the applied 
tariffs the estimates of the ad valorem effects of NTBs are food and tobacco, textiles, 
fertilizers, non-metal industries, iron and steel, and “other industries” (which include 
motor vehicles). As mentioned in Section 5, the textiles, fertilizer, iron and steel sectors 
closely match the industries for which NTB estimates were available, and so these 
estimates were applied directly. We applied the average NTB tariff-equivalent of 9 
percent (i.e., excluding the high-value-added goods with extremely high NTB   19 
equivalent estimates) to food and tobacco, non-metal industries and other industries. It 
was considered that these sectors would enjoy the type of NTB protection characteristic 
of the manufacturing industries addressed in the Hanafy estimates; and for other 
tradables no NTB effects were applied. This is, of course, an assumption, which we 
consider not unreasonable. For the five non-tradable sectors NTB, tariff equivalents are 
not applicable.  
 
The results for the ERPs by sector, including NTBs, are reported in Table 5b. The sixth 
column of the Table sums up the total ERP results. The reader should note that, for 
those sectors that maintain positive value-added without interventions, the ERPs due to 
trade policy (applied tariffs and NTBs) remain highly dispersed, as is the case found in 
Table 5a ignoring NTB effects. A notably result is that, as seen in the third column of 
figures in Table 5b, there are five sectors with negative value added without 
intervention, two more than in the case of the exclusion of NTB estimates in Table 5a. 
Electricity is a special case, heavily dependent on subsidized energy; and so is fuel oil 
(mazot). More relevant to trade policy makers are the other three sectors. The sector 
“other chemicals” appears with a negative value added, with and without the inclusion 
of NTB equivalents in the estimation of ERPs – this sector appears dependent on energy 
subsidies and to a lesser extent on tariff protection. Including the NTB estimates in the 
ERPs adds two sectors to the negative-value-added group: food and tobacco, and 
fertilizers, both with very high ERPs even excluding NTB effects. These are suspect 
sectors, in terms of their economic sustainability. In addition, outside of the fuel sectors, 
“iron and steel” and “other industries” enjoy even higher ERPs when including NTB 
effects, but a large percentage of their ERPs derives from energy subsidies (58 percent 
in the case of iron and steel, and 73 percent for other industries).  
 
With respect to the estimates of ERPs in tables 5a and 5b, you ask what is the logic for a 
“lower” ERP when considering NTBs.  
 
First, note that 5a reports ERPs as if NTBs did not exist and the only distortions to 
prices were from tariffs and energy subsidies. The ERP estimate is based on a 
hypothetical value added without these two distortions. Table 5b then considers the 
impact of NTBs as a third source of price distortions, and so the hypothetical value 
added (from which the ERP derives) without distortions is different than in 5a. As we 
note in the report, one result of the comparison of 5a and 5b is that there are five sectors 
with negative value added without the three types of intervention (tariff, energy subsidy 
and NTB), two more than in the case of the exclusion of NTB estimates in Table 5a. 
“Electricity is a special case, heavily dependent on subsidized energy; and so is fuel oil 
(mazot). More relevant to trade policy makers are the other three sectors. The sector 
“other chemicals” appears with a negative value added, with and without the inclusion 
of NTB equivalents in the estimation of ERPs – this sector appears dependent on energy 
subsidies and to a lesser extent on tariff protection. Including the NTB estimates in the 
ERPs adds two sectors to the negative-value-added group: food and tobacco, and 
fertilizers, both with very high ERPs even excluding NTB effects. These are suspect 
sectors, in terms of their economic sustainability.”  
 
The reader will note some declines in ERPa from 5a to 5b. In the case of food and 
tobacco and fertilizer, this change is not “real” but an artifact of the negative value 
added of the two sectors when considering NTBs. As noted above in the discussion of 
negative value added activities, ERP estimates can be negative due to the negative   20 
denominator and a positive numerator. In this case, the true rate of protection is given 
by the absolute value of the ERPs, which we indicate by placing the estimates 
associated with this sector in parentheses. 
 
But more intuitively interesting, is the case of agriculture. Agriculture’s, ERP declines 
when considering NTBs relative to excluding NTBs, because the NTBs applied to 
intermediate inputs used by agriculture. NTBs act to “disprotect” agriculture.  
 
By contrast, textiles are protected by NTBs. By excluding them from the estimates the 
ERP due to tariffs on textiles is negative – tariffs act as a net tax on the sector (-7.5%) – 
but energy subsidies offset the tariffs for a total ERP of 20.3% . But including NTBs in 
the estimates raises the ERP to 50%, meaning that NTBs provide a net protection. There 
is a NTB tariff-equivalent of 6.39% protecting textiles, without much NTB protection 
on the intermediate inputs used by the activity. 
 
8. Concluding Discussion: The Unexpectedly High ERP Dispersion and Strong 
Effect of Energy Subsidies 
 
This study has addressed four themes. First, it has compared for several selected 
disaggregated industries current ERP estimates derived from tariff schedules with those 
of a decade ago when at the initial stages of trade reforms. Second, it has presented 
recent effective rates of protection measure across the Egyptian economy using 23 
aggregated sectors from available input-output matrix information. Third, it has 
incorporated and estimated the importance of energy subsidies in these ERP estimates, 
taking advantage of the fact that the input-output matrix has five disaggregated energy-
related sectors for which we have subsidy estimates. Fourth, it has incorporated 
estimates of the tariff-equivalents of non-tariff barriers into ERP estimates. Key results 
are presented in Tables 4 and 5, and show that, broadly speaking, trade liberalization 
since the late-1990s has had a considerable impact in reducing protection of some 
industries. Nevertheless, some sectors, such as the food and tobacco sector, remain 
relatively hightly protected, due to tariff escalation and NTBs on the trade side, and due 
to energy subsidies on the input side. Energy subsidies are not formally sector specific 
but favor sectors that are energy intensive, and of particular note is the electricity sector.  
 
Since the mid-1980s the Egyptian government has moved towards a reliance on private 
economic activity and trade openness, pursuing trade liberalization, elimination of 
quantitative restrictions on imports, and reduction in tariffs overall. Although Egypt is 
still a case of obvious tariff escalation, greater openness to trade appears to have 
reduced the levels of both nominal protection and effective protection in the selected 
industries for which we have information, although ERPs remain high for some, and 
even higher if NTB equivalent estimates are taken into account. On average, Table 4a 
shows that ERPs in the private sector have declined over the past the decade from 86 
percent to 45 percent, and nominal rates of protection have declined generally across the 
board. (But these comparisons over time exclude NTBs, because NTBs estimate were 
not available for the late 1990s.)  
 
The dispersion of ERPs across these selected industries, as measured by the standard 
deviation, fell between 1999 and 2009 from 192 to 57 percent. Nevertheless, certain 
industries increased their ERPs, because, although tariffs fell on the final product, they   21 
fell even more on inputs. The textile group (except garments) is a case in point, where 
tariffs fell from 36% to 30%, between 1999 and 2009, but raw materials decline 
significantly, some to 5% by 2009. ERP on textiles rose from 84% to 229% Consumer 
benefited, certainly, but returns to domestic value added in the industry increases by 145 
percentage points.   
 
Turning to the 23 aggregated sectors making up the Egyptian economy, we find that the 
average tariff across lines is approximately 8 percent and the dispersion of nominal 
protection on tradables is not very high, the levels of tariffs ranging between zero on 
fertilizers to 25.8 percent on food. The sectors with the relatively highest tariffs are food 
and tobacco (not production agriculture), textiles, aluminum products, other industries 
and non-metal industries, in that order. But there is an unexpectedly high dispersion of 
ERPs relative to what one would expect looking at only applied tariffs. Despite the 
relatively low dispersion of nominal tariffs, the dispersion of effective rates of 
protection is wide, from high positive to high negatives. Even excluding NTBs, the 
standard deviation of total ERPs is 373 percent in comparison to an average level of 190 
percent. The bulk of the average ERPs and their dispersion derives not from energy 
subsidies but from the tariffs and output subsidies. The average ERP due to energy 
subsidies over these 20 sectors is 53 percent with a standard deviation of 82 percent.  
The estimates of the tariff equivalents of NTBs are also highly dispersed. And so the 
dispersion of ERPs is even greater if one adjusts for NTBs, as shown by comparing in 
Tables 5a and 5b. 
 
A notable result of the ERP estimates by the sectors available from the 2006/2007 I-O 
matrix is that energy subsidies are very important. For example, in the absence of 
subsidies on natural gas electricity prices would have to rise. Transport and 
communications (non-tradables), while taxed indirectly through imported input use, 
enjoys a positive total ERP due to fuel subsidies. Sectors that are taxed on the trade 
policy side (especially due to tradable input use by non-tradable sectors) are 
compensated by energy subsidies, suggesting that energy pricing is part of a strategy to 
subsidize and promote certain industries and in effect offset the dis-protection or 
taxation that results from tariffs on intermediate inputs. As mentioned in the text, the 
case of the cement sector is notable because energy subsidies appear to almost exactly 
offset the negative impacts of tariffs and indirect taxes. The fertilizer sector is also 
notable because, using Table 5a, it has zero nominal tariffs on the product side (a 
benefit to agriculture) but ends up with a very high a positive total ERP due to energy 




The only way to enssure similar effective rates of protection, even with moderate rates 
of nominal protection on final products, is to have uniform rates of nominal protection 
across all sectors, and the removal of non-tariff barriers. The current Egyptian tariff 
schedule shows obvious tariff escalation, and dispersion in ERPs.
13 In addition, it 
appears that some industries enjoy high protection from NTBs. The study helps reveal 
which sectors and industries are “suspect”, in that their sustainability is more dependent 
on policy discretion rather than their economic competitiveness. The pros and cons of 
benefiting these suspect industries are important policy questions, which could be 
pursued in the future. Moreover, the NTB estimates used in this study derive from 
comparing domestic and border prices, and so another question of interest regards the 
mechanism through which NTBs operate.  
 
The advantages of lower level of nominal protection are that, by promoting competition 
they promote higher productivity, and that lower protection reduces the implicit tax on 
export sectors that derives from restrictions on imports. The advantage of uniform and 
relatively low tariffs – and the elimination of NTBs – is to guard against capricious and 
distorting differences in effective protection rates across industries. In addition, in terms 
of political economic pressures, the transparency of tariff uniformity and no NTBs 
makes clear when some industries attempt to turn the tariff schedule and other import 
restriction in their favor. 
 
Energy subsidies complicate the Egyptian case considerably by creating additional 
advantages to some sectors relative to others. In fact, as the analysis shows, some 
sectors can be harmed by the direct effects of the tariff (and NTB) regime, but wind up 
benefiting due to energy subsidies on the input side. Not only do energy subsidies 
distort the incentive framework, they represent a high fiscal cost.  
 
The transition to a continuous reduction in energy subsidies could raise political 
economy questions beyond this study, but should be part of the policy debate. Like food 
subsidies, energy subsidies tend to become institutionalized and their removal faces 
political resistance. Some countries, such as Indonesia, have implemented gradual 
reductions in energy subsidies accompanied by targeted compensation schemes, 
facilitating the transition.  
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Tables 





tariff (%)  Item description 
220410  1  3000.0  Sparkling wine of fresh grapes 
220510  1  3000.0 
Vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes, flavoured with plants or aromatic substances, in containers of 
<= 2 l 
220590  1  3000.0 
Vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes, flavoured with plants or aromatic substances, in containers of > 
2 l 
220600  1  3000.0 
Cider, perry, mead and other fermented beverages and mixtures of fermented beverages and non-alcoholic 
beverages, n.e.s. (excl. beer, wine or fresh grapes, grape must, vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes 
flavoured with plants or aromatic substances) 
220820  1  3000.0  Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine or grape marc 
220830  1  3000.0  Whiskies 
220840  1  3000.0  Rum and other spirits obtained by distilling fermented sugar-cane products 
220850  1  3000.0  Gin and Geneva 
220860  1  3000.0  Vodka 
220870  1  3000.0  Liqueurs and cordials 
220421  1  1800.0 
Wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified wines, and grape must whose fermentation has been arrested by the 
addition of alcohol, in containers of <= 2 l (excl. sparkling wine) 
220429  1  1800.0 
Wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified wines, and grape must whose fermentation has been arrested by the 
addition of alcohol, in containers of > 2 l (excl. sparkling wine) 
220890  2  1515.0 
Ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength of < 80% vol, not denatured; spirits and other spirituous beverages 
(excl. compound alcoholic preparations of a kind used for the manufacture of beverages, spirits obtained 
by distilling grape wine or grape marc, whiskies, rum and other spirits obtained by distilling fermented 
sugar-cane products, gin, geneva, vodka, liqueurs and cordials) 
330210  2  1502.5 
Mixtures of odoriferous substances and mixtures, incl. alcoholic solutions, with a basis of one or more of 
these substances, of a kind used in the food and drink industries; other preparations based on odoriferous 
substances, of a kind used for the manufacture of beverages 
220300  1  1200.0  Beer made from malt   25 
210690  3  1001.7  Food preparations, n.e.s. 
220430  1  600.0 
Grape must, of an actual alcoholic strength of > 0,5% vol (excl. grape must whose fermentation has been 
arrested by the addition of alcohol) 
871610  1  135.0  Trailers and semi-trailers of the caravan type, for housing or camping 
870324  3  61.7 
Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, incl. station wagons 
and racing cars, with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine of a cylinder capacity 
> 3.000 cm³ (excl. vehicles for the transport of persons on snow and other specially designed vehicles of 
subheading 8703.10) 
870333  3  61.7 
Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, incl. station wagons 
and racing cars, with compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine "diesel or semi-diesel 
engine" of a cylinder capacity > 2.500 cm³ (excl. vehicles for the transport of persons on snow and other 
specially designed vehicles of subheading 8703.10) 
870323  4  56.3 
Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, incl. station wagons 
and racing cars, with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine of a cylinder capacity 
> 1.500 cm³ but <= 3.000 cm³ (excl. vehicles for the transport of persons on snow and other specially 
designed vehicles of subheading 8703.10) 
870332  4  56.3 
Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, incl. station wagons 
and racing cars, with compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine "diesel or semi-diesel 
engine" of a cylinder capacity > 1.500 cm³ but <= 2.500 cm³ (excl. vehicles for the transport of persons on 
snow and other specially designed vehicles of subheading 8703.10) 
870390  4  56.3 
Motor cars and other vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, incl. station wagons and 
racing cars, with engines other than spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine "diesel 
or semi-diesel engine" (excl. vehicles for the transport of persons on snow and other specially designed 
vehicles of subheading 8703.10) 
870210  1  40.0 
Motor vehicles for the transport of >= 10 persons, incl. driver, with compression-ignition internal 
combustion piston engine "diesel or semi-diesel engine" 
870290  1  40.0 
Motor vehicles for the transport of >= 10 persons, incl. driver, not with compression-ignition internal 
combustion piston engine "diesel or semi-diesel engine", of a cylinder capacity of > 2.500 cm³, new 
870321  1  40.0 
Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, incl. station wagons 
and racing cars, with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine of a cylinder capacity 
<= 1.000 cm³ (excl. vehicles for the transport of persons on snow and other specially designed vehicles of 
subheading 8703.10) 
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Table 2. Value added at factor cost and market prices for five energy sectors, current millions LE, 2006/2007. 
Energy sector 
Gross value added at factor 
costs  (includes subsidies, 
less taxes and import duties) 
Gross value added 
at market prices 
(revenue from 
sales to buyers 
less intermediate 
input costs)  Subsidies 
Subsidies as 
percentage of 
value added at 
factor costs 
NATURAL GAS  64034  58682  6282  9.8% 
FUEL OIL (MAZOT)  4394  1723  2937  66.8% 
GAS OIL (SOLAR)  14032  2393  12016  85.6% 
LPG  6771  427  6679  98.6% 
GASOLINE  4328  1643  2796  64.6% 
Source: 23 sector input-output matrix supplied by the World Bank Cairo office. Note that the first column represents net revenues to the industry and what is important at the 
firm level. The firm sells the product at a market price, receives a subsidy and pays indirect taxes and import duties on any imported intermediate inputs, and then pays for 
intermediate input costs. This value added at factor costs is what is available to pay for labor and returns to capital and other sector-specific resources. Gross value added at 
market prices is value added at factor costs less subsidies paid to the industry plus indirect taxes and import duties paid by the industry.  
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Table 3. Ad valorem subsidy adjustments to input costs for five energy products, based on current prices and actual domestic costs. 
Energy product 
Percentage increases in 
current prices of energy 
products to adjust to 
actual domestic costs 
Corresponding ad 
valorem subsidy rate 
in percentage terms 
(SI) 
Natural gas  80.8  44.7 
Mazot (fuel oil)  106.4  51.6 
Solar (diesel oil)  206.7  67.4 
LPG  1320  93.0 
Gasoline  86.3  46.3 
Source: Rates in the first column (δ) from Abouleinein, El-Laithy and Kheir-El-Din (2009); rates in the second column (Si) author’s calculations: Si = δ/(1+ δ). 
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Table 4a. Estimates of Effective Rates of Protection for selected industries, 2009 and 1998 (only tariffs, excluding NTBs and subsidies). 
ISIC 
code  Sector name 
Private industries  Public industries 
ERP 2009  ERP 1998  Change  ERP 2009  ERP 1998  Change 
1711  Spinning, weaving & finishing textiles  15.7%  45.6%  -29.9%  16.3%  46.6%  -30.4% 
1721  Textile products except garments  228.8%  83.5%  145.4%  na  na  na 
1722  Manufacture of carpets & rugs  91.6%  63.7%  28.0%  na  175.7%  -769.1% 
2102  Manufacture of containers, boxes of paper & paper boards  242.4%  -11083.0%  11325.4%  na  529.3%  -386.9% 
2101  Manufacture of pulp, paper & paper board articles  21.1%  40.4%  -19.4%  28.9%  59.9%  -31.0% 
2412  Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides  -0.4%  20.7%  -21.1%  -2.0%  31.2%  -33.2% 
2423  Manufacture of drugs & medicines  5.9%  6.1%  -0.3%  6.1%  5.8%  0.3% 
2424  Manufacture if soap, perfume & cosmetics  76.7%  58.4%  18.3%  -1224.9%  385.0%  -1610.0% 
2511  Tire & tube industries  98.0%  849.2%  -751.2%  37.5%  111.0%  -73.5% 
2610  Manufacture of glass & glass products  58.2%  38.0%  20.2%  212.1%  72.0%  140.1% 
2694  Manufacture of cement, lime & plaster  -1.6%  31.9%  -33.5%  -1.0%  29.6%  -30.6% 
2710  Iron & steel basic industries  23.3%  31.4%  -8.1%  21.3%  29.1%  -7.8% 
2720  Non-ferrous metal basic industries  17.9%  27.7%  -9.8%  15.5%  23.6%  -8.1% 
2893  Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools & general hardware  4.6%  34.0%  -29.3%  na  34.0%  -29.4% 
2921  Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment  4.9%  10.6%  -5.7%  na  15.5%  -10.8% 
3110  Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery & apparatus  4.5%  25.7%  -21.2%  na  na  na 
2930  Manufacture of electrical appliances & housewares  78.8%  83.1%  -4.3%  na  193.4%  444.7% 
3410  Manufacture of motor vehicles  15.5%  57.9%  -42.4%  35.6%  218.5%  -182.9% 
3811  Manufacture of jewelry & related articles  65.8%  32.6%  33.2%  na  na  na 
  Average  45.0%*  85.6%*    37.0%  122.5%   
  Standard deviation  71.7%*  191.8%*    63.1%  144.8%   
Source : Authors calculations from WTO Integrated database of HS6 tariffs (2009) and information in Al Iskandarani for costs of importables as share of total output, and tariffs 
1998. Note that na corresponds to industries not appearing as public sector in CAPMAS sources. Note that six public industries have been eliminated by 2007/2008. Note, */For 
the private sector, statistics exclude the group 2102 (container, boxes). If included, the average and the standard deviation of ERPs for private industries in 1998 would be -502 
and 2569 percent, respectively. For the public sector the statistics exclude 2424 (soap). If include the average and standard deviation would be -77.7 and 385.2 percent, 
respectively. 
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Table 4b. Estimates of Effective Rates of Protection for selected industries, 2009 (applied tariffs and tariff equivalent NTBs). 
ISIC 
code  Sector name 
ERP 2009 
Private  Public 
1711  Spinning, weaving & finishing textiles  16.4%  -167.5% 
1721  Textile products except garments  9988.5%  na 
1722  Manufacture of carpets & rugs  na  na 
2102  Manufacture of containers, boxes of paper & paper boards  na  na 
2101  Manufacture of pulp, paper & paper board articles  66.6%  102.9% 
2412  Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides  17.3%  22.7% 
2423  Manufacture of drugs & medicines  7.2%  6.4% 
2424  Manufacture if soap, perfume & cosmetics  981.1%  -180.4% 
2511  Tire & tube industries  -4647.9%  141.1% 
2610  Manufacture of glass & glass products  68.4%  214.1% 
2694  Manufacture of cement, lime & plaster  -1.4%  -7.1% 
2710  Iron & steel basic industries  29.4%  27.8% 
2720  Non-ferrous metal basic industries  na  na 
2893  Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools & general hardware  34.2%  na 
2921  Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment  11.9%  na 
3110  Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery & apparatus  15.7%  na 
2930  Manufacture of electrical appliances & housewares  100.6%  na 
3410  Manufacture of motor vehicles  18945.7%  -179.3% 
3811  Manufacture of jewelry & related articles  216.9%  na 
  Average  1527.5%  -1.9% 
  Standard deviation  5254.1%  137.6% 
Source : Authors calculations from WTO Integrated database of HS6 tariffs (2009) and information in Al Iskandarani for costs of importables as share of total output, and tariffs 
1998. Tariff equivalents for NTBs were estimated by Dr. Khaled Hanafy, details in Annex 3. Note that na corresponds to industries not appearing as public sector in CAPMAS 
sources. Note that six public industries have been eliminated by 2007/2008.   30 
 Table 5a. ERPs, 23 Egyptian sectors, tariffs 2009, I-O matrix 2006/2007, with output subsidies less indirect taxes, and energy subsidies (without NTBs). 




Estimated percentage value added 
relative to gross output without 
intervention 
ERP due directly to 
tariffs and output 
subsidies 
Addition to ERP due 
to energy subsidies  Total ERP 
Percent of ERP due 
to energy subsidies 
AGRICULTURE  8.30  77.8%  9.7%  0.4%  10.0%  3.49% 
CRUDE OIL& EXTRACTIVE  3.39  95.7%  1.7%  0.0%  1.7%  0.00% 
NATURAL GAS  5.00  98.1%  14.6%  0.0%  14.6%  0.00% 
FOOD & TOBACCO  25.76  4.9%  481.0%  262.4%  743.4%  35.30% 
TEXTILE  15.12  21.3%  -7.5%  27.8%  20.3%  137.02% 
FERTILIZERS  0.00  11.3%  -44.7%  263.7%  219.0%  120.43% 
OTHER CHEMICAL  8.41  -12.2%  (8.6%)  (243.2%)  (251.7%)  96.60% 
FUEL OIL (MAZOT)  5.00  -2.8%  (467.0%)  (303.4%)  (770.4%)  39.39% 
GAS OIL (SOLAR)  5.00  10.7%  769.6%  72.0%  841.6%  8.56% 
LPG  5.00  14.6%  1409.7%  0.0%  1409.7%  0.00% 
GASOLINE  5.00  15.7%  191.1%  0.0%  191.1%  0.00% 
CEMENT  2.38  47.9%  -35.1%  33.5%  -1.6%  - 
NON METAL INDUSTRIES  10.14  42.2%  -25.7%  28.8%  3.1%  927.79% 
IRON & STEEL  7.71  20.6%  12.3%  57.1%  69.4%  82.25% 
ALUMINUM & PRODUCTS  12.83  25.0%  29.7%  28.6%  58.3%  49.03% 
METAL INDUSTRIES  7.70  45.8%  2.2%  7.4%  9.7%  77.00% 
ENGINEERING & MACHINERY  5.12  32.7%  -10.7%  17.6%  6.9%  255.29% 
OTHER INDUSTRIES  11.95  10.6%  8.0%  168.6%  176.6%  95.49% 
CONSTRUCTION  0.00  49.8%  -15.8%  0.0%  -15.7%  -0.30% 
ELECTRICITY  0.00  -25.3%  (29.2%)  (223.1%)  (193.9%)  115.08% 
TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION  0.00  43.7%  -11.1%  63.2%  52.1%  121.28% 
HOTELS & RESTAURANTS  0.00  30.9%  -13.4%  8.7%  -4.7%  -183.21% 
OTHER SERVICES  0.00  67.1%  -9.8%  12.5%  2.8%  451.76% 
average  7.99*  31.57%  137.79%  52.62%  190.42%  114.80% 
Standard deviation  5.8  31.7%  360.83%  82.09%  373.52%  234.14% 
Source: Authors calculations based on 2006/2007 input-output matrix for Egypt. Note that value added is at factor costs (including subsidies less indirect taxes). The last column 
represents the ratio of the fourth column of figures relative to the fifth. Note that the standard deviation of the average tariffs only includes tradables. */Note that the average 
applied tariff is across tradable sectors only. Averages of ERPs in last 4 columns only include sectors for which VA is positive without intervention.    31 
Table 5b. ERPs, 23 Egyptian sectors, tariffs 2009, I-O matrix 2006/2007, with output subsidies less indirect taxes, NTB effects, and energy subsidies. 







Estimated percentage value 
added relative to gross 
output without intervention 
ERP due directly to 
tariffs and output 
subsidies 
Addition to ERP due 
to energy subsidies  Total ERP 
Percent of ERP 
due to energy 
subsidies 
AGRICULTURE  8.30  0.00  78.3%  9.0%  0.3%  9.3%  3.7% 
CRUDE OIL& EXTRACTIVE  3.39  0.00  95.7%  1.7%  0.0%  1.7%  0.0% 
NATURAL GAS  5.00  0.00  98.1%  14.6%  0.0%  14.6%  0.0% 
FOOD & TOBACCO  25.76  9.00  -1.5%  (-2130.3%)  (-917.1%)  (-3047.4%)  30.1% 
TEXTILE  15.12  6.39  18.1%  15.3%  34.7%  50.0%  69.5% 
FERTILIZERS  0.00  15.91  -2.8%  (-361.4%)  (-1246.9%)  (-1608.3%)  77.5% 
OTHER CHEMICAL  8.41  0.00  -11.9%  (-6.4%)  (-248.8%)  (-255.3%)  97.5% 
FUEL OIL (MAZOT)  5.00  0.00  -2.8%  (-468.5%)  (-304.8%)  (-773.3%)  39.4% 
GAS OIL (SOLAR)  5.00  0.00  10.7%  768.7%  72.0%  840.6%  8.6% 
LPG  5.00  0.00  14.8%  1394.9%  0.0%  1394.9%  0.0% 
GASOLINE  5.00  0.00  15.7%  190.1%  0.0%  190.1%  0.0% 
CEMENT  2.38  0.00  47.9%  -35.1%  33.5%  -1.6%  -2076.9% 
NON METAL INDUSTRIES  10.14  9.00  38.1%  -10.9%  34.6%  23.6%  146.2% 
IRON & STEEL  7.71  8.18  15.9%  56.7%  79.6%  136.3%  58.4% 
ALUMINUM & PRODUCTS  12.83  0.00  26.2%  23.5%  27.2%  50.8%  53.6% 
METAL INDUSTRIES  7.70  0.00  46.9%  -0.2%  7.3%  7.1%  102.7% 
ENGINEERING & MACHINERY  5.12  0.00  33.6%  -13.1%  17.1%  4.0%  424.3% 
OTHER INDUSTRIES  11.95  9.00  5.2%  137.0%  370.2%  507.2%  73.0% 
CONSTRUCTION  0.00  0.00  50.6%  -17.1%  0.0%  -17.0%  -0.3% 
ELECTRICITY  0.00  0.00  -25.1%  30.2%  (-224.8%)  (-194.6%)  115.5% 
TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION  0.00  0.00  43.7%  -11.1%  63.2%  52.0%  121.4% 
HOTELS & RESTAURANTS  0.00  0.00  31.0%  -13.5%  8.7%  -4.9%  -177.6% 
OTHER SERVICES  0.00  0.00  67.2%  -9.9%  12.5%  2.6%  485.5% 
average  7.99*  2.50  28.5%  -19.4%  -99.7%  -119.1%  -37.9% 
Standard deviation  5.8  4.57  32.80%  583.06%  340.57%  832.57%  469.52% 
Source: Authors calculations based on 2006/2007 input-output matrix for Egypt. NTB tariff equivalents are based on the estimates of Dr. Khaled Hanafy (see Annex 3 for 
details). Note that value added is at factor costs (including subsidies less indirect taxes). The last column represents the ratio of the fifth column of figures relative to the sixth. 
Note that the standard deviation of the average tariffs only includes tradables. Note that the average applied tariff is across tradable sectors only. Average of ERPs in last 4 
columns only include sectors for which VA is positive without intervention.    32 
Table 6. Tariffs categories used for constructing average sector tariffs for ERP estimation of industries from input-output matrix 
  Sector name  HS code 2, 4 or 6 digit  Notes 
1  AGRICULTURE  01-05  Animal & Animal Products, 06-15  Vegetable Products   
2  CRUDE OIL& EXTRACTIVE  All  HS 27 except natural gas, fuel and gas oils, LPG, gasoline 
(light oils), see sectors below   
3  NATURAL GAS  271111  Natural gas, liquefied 
4  FOOD & TOBACCO  16-23  Foodstuffs (excluding tobacco)  Tobacco has specific duties, and note that alcohol beverages are 
excluded. See Table 1 above.  
5  TEXTILE  50-63  Textiles   
6  FERTILIZERS  31  FERTILIZERS  28-38  Chemicals & Allied Industries 
7  OTHER CHEMICAL  28 through 38 except 31  28-38  Chemicals & Allied Industries 
8  FUEL OIL (MAZOT)  27101910 --- Partly refined or distilled (trade-crude) benzine , 
Diesel oil, fuel oil (mazot),transformers oil   
9  GAS OIL (SOLAR)  271011 or 270900  Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which 
>= 90% by volume "incl. losses" distil at 210°C "ASTM D 86 method" 
10  LPG  271112  Propane, liquefied 
11  GASOLINE  271011  Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which 
>= 90% by volume "incl. losses" distil at 210°C "ASTM D 86 method" 
12  CEMENT 
25  SALT, SULPHUR, EARTH & STONE, LIME & 
CEMENT, 2521  limestone flux, lmstn & oth cal sto usd mfr 
lime, cement, 2523  portland cement, aluminous cement, slag 
cement etc, 252310  Cement Clinkers, 252321  White Cement 
(Portland cement), 252329  Other Portland Cement, 252330  
Aluminous Cement, 252390  Other Hydraulic Cements 
There are only few cements with tariff high than 2%. 
13  NON METAL INDUSTRIES 
39-40  Plastics / Rubbers ,   41-43  Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, 
& Furs,  44-49  Wood & Wood Products, 64-67  Footwear / 
Headgear, 68-71  Stone / Glass , 86-89  Transportation 
This is consider a miscellaneous grouping. 
14  IRON & STEEL  72  IRON & STEEL 73  RTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL  72-83  Metals 
15  ALUMINUM & PRODUCTS  76  ALUMINUM & ARTICLES THEREOF  72-83  Metals 
16  METAL INDUSTRIES  74, 75, 77-83  72-83  Metals   33 
17  ENGINEERING & 
MACHINERY  84-85  Machinery / Electrical   
18  OTHER INDUSTRIES  90-97  Miscellaneous   Another miscellaneous grouping. 
19  CONSTRUCTION  non tradable  Zero tariffs for non tradables 
20  ELECTRICITY  non tradable   
21  TRANSPORT & 
COMMUNICATION  non tradable   
22  HOTELS & RESTAURANTS  non tradable   
23  OTHER SERVICES  non tradable   
Source: Egypt’s 2009 tariff schedule reported to WTO and found in the Integrate Data Base, and groupings using HS6 listings in http://www.foreign-
trade.com/reference/hscode.htm   34 
Annex 1: Additional Tables 
 
Annex Table 1. Tariff profile for selected industries at the HS 6-digit level from WTO used in calculation of ERPs for 2009, and those from late 
1990s used by Al Iskandarani , by ISIC sector and tradable inputs. 
   
Tariffs associated with products 
and tradable inputs 2009 and those 
used by Al Iskandarani (2001) 
Share of 
input in cost 
of tradable 
inputs  Notes on product and tradable input correspondence 
to HS 2, 4 and 6-digit Egyptian tariff lines at 2009 
levels 
ISIC r.3.1  Sector name and import-competing activity  HS6 2009 
(WTO)  Al Iskandarani 
1711  Spinning, weaving & finishing textiles  0.10  0.35 
  HS 51 to 56, including only the woven (finished) 
products 
 
Broadwoven fabric mills & fabric finishing 
plants  0.05  0.39 
0.1 
 HS 51 to 56, but excluding the woven (finished) 
products 
  Yarn mills & finishing of textiles, n.e.c.  0.10  0.35 
0.5 
HS 51 to 56, including only the woven (finished) 
products 
  Textile goods, n.e.c.  0.05  0.28 
0.3 
HS 51 to 56, but excluding the woven (finished) 
products 
  Miscellaneous plastic products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11 
0.1 
HS 39, primary forms, and HS 54, threads and yarns 
(excluding woven products) 
1721  Textile products except garments (only 
private) 
0.30  0.36    HS 63 group non-apparel textils 
  Yarn mills & finishing of textiles, n.e.c.  0.10  0.35 
0.3 
HS 51 to 56, including only the woven (finished) 
products 
  Textile machinery  0.00  0.07  0.15  see HS 8445 to 8449 
  Chemicals & chemicals preparations, n.e.c.  0.02  0.2  0.15  HS 32, items with dyes for fabrics 
  Fabricated textile products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.39 
0.15 
HS 51 to 56, but excluding the woven (finished) 
products 
  Nonwoven fabrics  0.05  0.28 
0.1 
HS 51 to 56, but excluding the woven (finished) 
products   35 
  Thread mills  0.05  0.05 
0.1 
HS 51 to 56, but excluding the woven (finished) 
products 
1722  Manufacture of carpets & rugs  0.30  0.40    HS 57s 
  Yarn mills & finishing of textiles, n.e.c.  0.00  0.35  0.6  HS 8445 to 8449 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.2  HS 28s and 29s 
  Synthetic rubber (?)  0.02  0.05    HS 400291 400299 
  Textile machinery  0.00  0.07  0.05  HS 8445 to 8449 
  Drawings  0.00  0.2  0.15  HS 8445, drawing equipment 
2102  Manufacture of containers, boxes of paper 
& paper boards 
0.20  0.34    HS 481910 
  Paper & paper mills  0.02  0.05  0.8  HS 8439 and 4700s 
  Plastics materials & resins  0.05  0.07  0.05  HS 39, esp. 3911 
  Printing ink  0.10  0.2  0.05  HS 3215 
  Adhesives & sealants  0.10  0.2  0.05  HS 3506 
  Wood products  0.02  0.05  0.05  HS 4700s 
2101  Manufacture of pulp, paper & paper board 
articles 
0.10  0.17    see HS 48s 
  Paper & paperboard mills  0.02  0.05  0.5  see HS 8439 
  Die-cut paper & paperboard & cardboard  0.10  0.05  0.2  see HS 4802 
  Pulp mills  0.02  0.05  0.1  see HS 8439 
  Printing ink  0.10  0.2  0.1  see HS 3215 
  Scrap  0.02  0.05  0.1  see HS 4706 
2412  Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides  0.00  0.18    see HS 3100s 
  Chemicals & fertilizers minerals  0.00  0.05  0.5  see hs 31s 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.4  see HS 28 and 29s 
  Bags, except textile  0.10  0.2  0.1  see HS 3923 
2423  Manufacture of drugs & medicines  0.05  0.08    see HS 3003 and 3004 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.07  0.6  see HS 28 and 29s 
  Packing: other than plastics  0.10  0.15  0.2  see HS 4804 
  Drugs  0.05  0.07  0.1  see HS 3003 and 3004 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.1  see HS 3920s 
2424  Manufacture if soap, perfume & cosmetics  0.30  0.31    see 3401s and 33s   36 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.4  see HS 28 and 29s 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.3  see HS 3920s 
  Paperboard containers & boxes  0.20  0.33  0.15  see HS 481910 
  Surface active agents  0.02  0.1  0.05  see HS 3402s 
  Petroleum refining  0.02  0.1  0.05  see HS 2712 
  Toilet preparation  0.05  0.1  0.05  see HS 3301 
2511  Tire & tube industries  0.10  0.29 
  4011s, note 10% for trucks, 20% cars, 5% aircraft, 
construction equipment and ag machines 
  Tire cord & fabrics  0.05  0.2  0.3  see HS 5902s 
  Synthetic rubber  0.02  0.1  0.3  see HS 4002s 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.2  see HS 28 and 29s 
  Fabricated rubber products, n.e.c.  0.02  0.2  0.1  see HS 4003 and 4004 
  Carbon black  0.02  0.1  0.05  see HS 280300 
  Miscellaneous fabricated wire products  0.05  0.1  0.05  see HS 7217s 
2610  Manufacture of glass & glass products  0.30  0.27 
  see HS 7003 to 7013, there are some consumer wares 
for 10% and 20% 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.3  see HS 28 and 29s 
  Glass & glass products, except containers  0.05  0.2  0.3  see HS 7001 and 7002 
  Special dies & tools & machine tool 
accessories  0.02  0.07 
0.2 
see HS 8475, machines for glass 
  Paperboard containers & boxes  0.20  0.33  0.1  see HS 481910 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.1  see HS 3920s 
2694  Manufacture of cement, lime & plaster  0.02  0.20    HS 2523  portland cement, aluminous cement, slag 
cement etc 
  Minerals, ground or treated  0.02  0.1  0.45  see HS 2521 
  Cement, hydraulic  0.10  0.1  0.4  see HS 2522s 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.1  see HS 28 and 29s 
  Bags except textile  0.10  0.3  0.05  see HS 3923 
2710  Iron & steel basic industries  0.10  0.16     
  Primary metal products, n.e.c.  0.02  0.1  0.6  see HS 7201 
  Primary nonferrous products, n.e.c.  0.02  0.03  0.15  see 74 to 80, basic metal goods 
  Iron & steel forging  0.05  0.05  0.1  see 8462s   37 
  Screw machine products, bolts, etc.  0.10  0.1  0.1  see HS 7318s 
  Special dies & tools & machine tool 
accessories  0.05  0.07 
0.05 
see 8462s 
2720  Non-ferrous metal basic industries  0.10  0.24    see 74 to 80 groups, finished products 
  Primary metal products, n.e.c.  0.02  0.05  0.3  see 74 to 80 groups, basic metals 
  Primary aluminium  0.10  0.05  0.3  see HS 7601 and 7603 
  Machine tools, metal forming types  0.05  0.08  0.2  see HS 8460s 
  Scrap  0.00  0.05  0.1  see HS 7204 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.05  see HS 28 and 29s 
2893  Manufacture of cutlery, handtools & 
general hardware 
0.05  0.20 
  see HS 8202, note that for cutlery and consumer 
hardward (clippers, etc.) tariffs are 30% 
  Iron & steel foundries  0.05  0.05  0.3  see 8462s 
  Aluminium rolling & drawing  0.05  0.05  0.3  see 8454, 8455 
  Screw machine products, bolts, etc.  0.10  0.08  0.15  see 7318 
  Metal stamping, n.e.c.  0.05  0.08  0.1  see 8462s 
  Motors & generators  0.02  0.11  0.1  see 8501s, note that for some motors, tariffs are 30% 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.05  see HS 3920s 
2921  Manufature of agricultural machinery and 
equipment 
0.05  0.09    8433 see also between 8431 to 8436 
  Iron & steel foundries  0.05  0.03  0.55  see 8462s 
  Mechanical power transmission equipment  0.05  0.1  0.15  see 8483s 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.1  see HS 3920s 
  Tires & inner tubes  0.05  0.29  0.1  see 4011s, tyres for agricultural equipment 
  Farm machinery equipment  0.02  0.05  0.05  see 84s related to agriculture, e.g., 8432s 
  Screw machine products  0.10  0.1  0.05  see 7318 
3110  Manufacture of electrical industrial 
machinery & apparatus 
0.05  0.19 
  see 85s, industrial is 2 and 5 and 10%, consumer goods 
30% 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.3  see HS 3920s 
  Non-ferrous wire drawing & insulating  0.05  0.3  0.3  see 8408s 
  Other electrionic components  0.06  0.08  0.1  the average for HS 85 
  Metal stamping n.e.c.  0.05  0.08  0.1  8455 to 8463 
  Blast furnaces & steel mills  0.05  0.05  0.05  8456 to 8463   38 
  Relays & industrial controls  0.10  0.05 
0.05 
see 8536s, note that for 853650 there are 5 items with 
tariffs between 0 and 20.  
  Other electrionic components  0.06  0.08  0.05  the average for HS 85 
  Plating & polishing  0.05  0.1  0.05  8456 to 8463 
2930  Manufacture of electrical appliances & 
housewares 
0.30  0.36 
  see 85s, industrial is 2 and 5 and 10%, consumer goods 
30% 
  Blast furnaces & steel mills  0.05  0.12  0.2  8456 to 8463 
  Hardware n.e.c.  0.05  0.1  0.15  see HS 8202 for equipment. 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.1  see HS 3920s 
  Motors & generators  0.02  0.05  0.1  see 8501s 
  Plastics, materials, resins  0.05  0.07  0.1  see HS 39, esp. 3911 
  Refrigeration & heating equipment  0.15  0.15  0.1  see 841430, there are 3 items from 5 to 30%, average 15 
  Screw machine products, bolts, etc.  0.10  0.1  0.1  see 7318 
  Wiring devices  0.05  0.3 
0.1 
see 85s, industrial is 2 and 5 and 10%, consumer goods 
30% 
  Paper board containers & boxes  0.20  0.33  0.05  see HS 481910 
3410  Manufacture of motor vehicles  0.10  0.35 
  see hs 87s, note that there are 3 tariffs, 10%, 40% and 
135%. 
  Motor vehicle parts & accessories  0.03  0.15  0.4  average 8708 group 
  Motor vehicles & passenger car bodies  0.05  0.3  0.15  8707 
  Automotive stampings  0.05  0.08  0.1  8455 to 8463, especially 8462 
  Internal combustion engines, n.e.c.  0.05  0.2  0.1  8407 group relevant to automobiles 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.  0.05  0.11  0.05  see HS 3920s 
  Refrigeration & heating equipment  0.05  0.15  0.05  841520 
  Electric equipment for internal combustion 
engines  0.05  0.2 
0.05 
854430 
  Paints & allied products  0.10  0.15  0.05  see 8208 
  Tires & inner tubes  0.20  0.29 
0.03 
see 4011s, 5% for ag, 10 for buses and 20% for standard 
autos 
  Automotive & apparel trimmings  0.03  0.15  0.02  average 8708 group 
3811  Manufacture of jewerly & related articles  0.30  0.22    see 71s finished products, e.g., 7117 
  Primary nonferrous metals, n.e.c.  0.06  0.1  0.7  average for 7101 to 7112   39 
  Jewelers' materials & lapidary work  0.06  0.15  0.1  average for 7101 to 7113 
  Rolling, drawing & extruding of cooper  0.02  0.15  0.1  8206 to 8209 group 
  Fabricated metal products, n.e.c.  0.06  0.15  0.05  average for 7101 to 7113 
  Chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.05  see HS 28 and 29s 
2691  Manufacture of pottery, china & 
earthenware (only public sector) 
0.3  0.3    see 6905 to 6913, ranges from 10 to 30% 
  Industrial inorganic & organic chemicals  0.02  0.11  0.4  see HS 28 and 29s 
  Lima & clay  0.02  0.1  0.4  HS 2507 
  Metal stampings, n.e.c.  0.05  0.07  0.1  see 8462s 
  Paperboard containers & boxes  0.2  0.33  0.1  see HS 481910 
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Annex Table 2. List of sectors from input-output matrices for Egypt 
Industries included in 2006/2007 
matrix used in this present study 
Industries included in 2005 
matrix used in Lederman (2005) 
Agriculture  Agriculture - vegetables 
Crude oil and extraction  Agriculture – animals 
Natural gas  Cotton products 
Food and tobacco  Mining and quarrying 
Textiles  Food industry 
Fertilizers  Beverages 
Other chemicals  Tobacco 
Fuel oil (mazot)  Textiles 
Gas oil (diesel)  Wood 
LPG  Paper 
Gasoline  Print 
Cement  Leather 
Non-metal industry  Rubber 
Iron and steel  Chemical industry 
Aluminum and its products  Petroleum 
Metal industry  Non-metal industry 
Engineering and machinery  Metal industry 
Other industries  Non-electrical machinery 
Construction  Electrical machinery 
Electricity  Transport machinery 
Transportation and communications  Other industries 
Hotels and restaurants (tourism)   
Other services   
   41 
Annex 2. Some details of the ERP algebra 
 
The hypothetical value added for the industry – the value added which would otherwise 
prevail without any protections and subsidies whatsoever on the revenue or cost sides –
can be written in terms of the observed cost share,  gi a , and the ad valorem protection 
rates. As noted in the text, the two cost shares are related: 
i gi i g g HH i
gi gi gi gi
g g g g g g i
p x (1 t ) (1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )
a a a a
p y (1 t )(1 s ) (1 t )(1 s ) 1 t
    
          
 
 
The hypothetical value added for industry g without protection and subsidies can then 
be written (with the superscript indicating the hypothetical): 
 
g g g
gg H H H H ii
g g g g gi g gi
i I i I i I g g i
(1 t )(1 s ) px
VA p y 1 R 1 a R 1 a
p y 1 t   
       
                          
    
 
The calculation of the ERPs is facilitated by noting that the observed value added can be 
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The ERP is then estimated as the percent difference of the observed value added from 
the hypothetical: 
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When adding input subsidies, the hypothetical cost shares are related to observed cost 
shares in the following manner:  
 
i gi i i g g HH ii
gi gi gi gi
g g g g g g i i
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The hypothetical, border-price-equivalent value added – that is, without tariffs and all 
subsidies – would now be: 
g g g
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Again the calculation of the ERPs is facilitated by noting that the currently observed 
value added (at factor costs, without deducting subsidies on outputs) can be rewritten in 
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But the hypothetical cost shares are not directly observable and so, as mentioned in the 
text, the practical formula for calculating the ERPs uses observed cost shares relative to 
gross revenue, adjusted by tariffs and subsidies: 
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Annex 3. Measuring the ad valorem equivalent of NTBs for selected industries 
 
The ad valorem equivalents of non-tariff barriers were estimated by Dr. Khalid Hanafy. 
This section discusses the NTB measures, deriving from a short report on NTBs 
submitted by Dr. Hanafy. The authors of this present report have made some slight 
editorial changes. 
 
Unlike tariffs, the price effects of non-tariff barriers are usually unobservable directly 
and must be inferred. One straightforward method to estimate the effect of non-tariff 
barriers on domestic prices is to use an ad-valorem price wedge net of tariffs and 
transportation costs. The price-wedge method attributes to NTBs the differences 
between an observed domestic price of an imported good and the border price (CIF) of 
the good – differences unexplained by tariffs, transport costs, marketing margins, 
quality differences, etc. Ad-valorem price wedges for specific goods attributed to NTBs 
can then be used as to approximate NTBs for industries or economic sectors. 
 
In practical terms the ad-valorem equivalent of NTBs, n, takes the difference between 
an observed domestic price, PD, (if retail, adjusted downward for marketing margins) 
and an observed border price, PW, (adjusted upwards for tariffs, t, and transport costs, 
k) and translates that difference into a percentage of the border price: 
DW
W






It is important to point out that although the price wedge approach gives an estimate of 
the value of NTBs, it says nothing about the exact policies or policy instruments acting 
as NTBs nor does it reflect their respective contributions. Moreover, although a similar 
quality of domestic and imported commodities is a requirement in the price wedge 
approach, in practical application this assumption does not always hold. It is not always 
an easy or straightforward task to determine objectively whether the products being 
compared are of comparable quality. In theory, differences in quality between the 
domestic and imported products could lead to further price adjustments, but in practice 
for some products price-equivalent measures of quality cannot be accurately accounted 
for. In addition, unobservable but normal trading and transactions costs beyond 
transport costs may not be fully accounted for, which would lead to the price wedge 




The data required to calculate the price wedges were collected from various sources for 
the domestic market price of the imported good and its border price (CIF). In a few 
cases the border prices were unavailable. In such cases these were replaced by retail 
prices of the imported product in the country of origin.   
 
For each industry representative products were chosen and the required analysis was 
performed. Where more than one product is available an average ad-valorem price gap 
was calculated for that industry as a whole.  
 
The NTB price wedges were also adjust marketing margins when the domestic prices 
were observed at the retail level. In such cases, the marketing margin was either 
obtained from the importer, or roughly estimated. In the remaining cases, it was   44 
considered unnecessary to take into account profit margins. There are two cases where 
the marketing margin is not applied in Annex Table 3:  
 
The domestic price of the imported product used is not the retail price. This is the case 
in pharmaceutical products, where data was obtained from domestic pharmaceutical 
companies importing inputs directly. Thus the domestic price as shown in the Annex 
Table 3 is not the retail price. This also holds for the industrial machinery and other 
sectors, such as cement and iron. 
 
The CIF price used was not available. Following some examples in the literature, the 
retail price in the country of origin was used instead. This yields an approximation that 
assumes that marketing margins in both cases are roughly equivalent, but that in the 
country of origin NTBs are zero (otherwise one would be computing the additional 
NTBs in Egypt).  
 
Data collection involved several channels 
 
Chamber of Commerce. Officials from the Chamber of Commerce were contacted and 
the issue of NTBs was discussed. The interviews covered the general conditions of 
importing and provided an overview of the most common NTBs present in Egypt. 
 
Federations. Federations offered background on issues related to NTBs in the respective 
industries and provided data for the representative products. 
 
Businessmen. Interviews and discussions with various businessmen in various fields 
enriched the study with insight regarding the nature and details of NTBs faced. 
Moreover, businessmen were able to provide the required price data. This was 
particularly constructive since the otherwise unobservable border prices were obtained. 
These businessmen varied from importers selling the imported product, or domestic 
producers importing specific inputs for use in their own production.     
 
Practitioners. Practitioners were also resorted to for information on prices of the 
imported product as well as those of close Egyptian substitutes. They were able to 
provide insight and helpful information on the issue. 
 
Market. The domestic market prices of several products, whether imported or domestic, 
were obtained from observation of the market itself. A survey of the available imported 
products was conducted as well as of the domestic product of almost identical quality. 
In some cases foreign prices of the imported product were obtained from online sources.  
 
Results from interviews  
 
Based on the interviews and discussions held with officials from the Chamber of 
Commerce, officials from federations, businessmen and practitioners, it was evident that 
some specific industries are protected to a greater extent than others from NTBs.  In 
general, importers in Egypt face from the following NTBs: 
 
The imported products have to pass through the General Assembly for the 
Control of Exports and Imports. This is done to ensure that imported products 
meet the Egyptian standard specifications.   45 
 
For activities with trade preferences, the importer has to document Country of 
Origin and the domestic component of the good. 
 
Certificate of Origin. There must be a certificate of origin from the place of 
production of the imported goods. 
 
Goods imported from China must meet the China Quality Certification. 
Anti-dumping duties. The aim is to abort the attempts of other countries to grant 
export subsidies to their producers. 
 
Sales taxes. In some cases, products are exempted from customs duties but must 




The cosmetics, soap & perfume sector enjoys to a greater extent protection from NTBs. 
Before importing the products, each type or model inside each category must be 
recorded in the Ministry of Health for 2000 EGP. The Ministry of Health takes 6 
samples from each type inside every category for lab testing, and a 5000 EGP fee for 
testing must be paid. Test results are received after 21 days to get the product’s final 
release. A sales tax applied to imported goods of 25% must be paid. Moreover, 3% of 
the invoice value must be paid to the ministry.  
 
Similar procedures are required for pharmaceutical industry. Imported products must 
pass through examinations causing time delays. Costs to the firm could lead to loss of 
business opportunities and unmet delivery due dates.  
 
A note on the accompanying Annex Table 3 
 
It is important to note that dollar prices were converted to the Egyptian currency at the 
rate of 5.5 EGP/$, and euro prices were converted at the rate of 7 EGP/€.        46 
Annex Table 3. Ad Valorem price wedges attributable to non-tariff barriers 





















1711  Spinning, weaving & finishing textiles                
   Spinning  30.36  27.78  0.02  0.01  0.02  1.41  5.07 
   Weaving  35.75  32.45  0.03  0.01  0.025  1.42  4.38 
   Finishing Textiles  51.48  43.45  0.04  0.01  0.04  4.22  9.72 
   Average for sector                 6.39 
1721  Textile products except garments                
   Table spread  120  60  0.3  0.01     41.99  69.98 
2101  Manufacture of pulp, paper & paper board articles 
   Art paper  6500  4840  0.1  70  0.15  131  2.71 
   Duplex (grey back)  4800  2475  0.1  70  0.15  1287.5  52.02 
   Board  7500  6325  0.1  70  0.05  97.5  1.54 
   Average for sector                 18.76 
2412  Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides                
   Fertilizers - Ammonia  1400  1100  0.05  70     175  15.91 
2423  Manufacture of drugs & medicines                    
   Aspartam  124.85  121  0.05  0.07     -2.27  -1.88 
   Avicel  37.235  30.8  0.05  0.07     4.83  15.67 
   Hepamerz  93.1  87.5  0.05  0.07     1.15  1.32 
   Average for sector                 5.04 
2424  Manufacture of soap, perfume & cosmetics               47 
   Soap  6  2.5  0.3  0.01  0.15  1.84  73.65 
   Cosmetics – Shampoo  22  9  0.3  0.01  0.23  5.23  58.14 
   Perfume  600  250  0.3  0.02  0.17  172.98  69.19 
   Average for sector                 66.99 
2511  Tire & tube industries                                        
   High quality truck tires  2500  1787.5  0.12  0.7  0.15  122.3  6.84 
   High quality light truck tires  750  385  0.12  0.49  0.2  168.31  43.72 
   High quality passenger tires  600  368.5  0.22  0.35  0.2  30.08  8.16 
   Average for sector                 19.57 
2610  Manufacture of glass & glass products                
   Glass cups  55  44  0.15  0.07     4.33  9.84 
2694  Manufacture of cement, lime & plaster                
   Cement (per ton)  492.5  462.5  0.05  6.5     0.38  0.08 
2710  Iron & steel basic industries                   
   Iron (per ton)  3100  2750  0.02  70     225  8.18 
2893  Manufacture of cutlery, handtools & general hardware  
   Drill  185  149  0.05  0.14     28.41  19.07 
2921  Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment 
   Grass cutting machine NR 
American 1.5 Horses”  1000  700  0.2  0.7  0.1  59.3  8.47 
   Grass cutting machine”NR 
American 2 Horses”  1500  1100  0.2  1  0.1  29  2.64 
   Grass cutting machine”NR 
American 4 Horses”  4000  2500  0.2  1.5  0.1  598.5  23.94   48 
  
Tractor “ NR American for 1 
Feddan”  15000  11000  0.2  1000  0.05  50  0.45 
  
Irrigation Machine” NR American”  10000  7000  0.2  500  0.1  100  1.43 
  
Draw water machine(30-100 m) 1”   10000  6500  0.2  500  0.1  700  10.77 
   Average for sector                    7.95 
3110  Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery & apparatus 
   Standard frame (textile industry)  8443620  7343730  0.05  1400     731303  9.96 
2930  Manufacture of electrical appliances & housewares 
   Refrigerator  3849  2519  0.4  7     315.4  12.52 
3410  Manufacture of motor vehicles                          
   Chrysler van  625000  137500  1.35  140     301735  219.44 
   Passat –VW   250000  152600  0.4  140     36220  23.74 
   Average for sector                 121.59 
3811  Manufacture of jewelry & related articles             
   Watch (Guess)  2500  1650  0.1  0.01     684.99  41.51 
 
 